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FROM WASHINGTON TO
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS AND
BEYOND: DISCRIMINATORY
PURPOSE IN EQUAL PROTECTION
LITIGATION
Robert G. Schwemm*
When the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis' on
June 7, 1976, it began a new era in civil rights law. Rejecting the
contention that state action is unconstitutional solely because it
operates to injure more blacks than whites, the Court held that
proof of discriminatory purpose is necessary to establish a claim of
racial discrimination under the equal protection clause. In two cases
decided the following term- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-3
politan Housing Development Corp.2 and Castaneda v. Partida
-the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the discriminatory purpose requirement, but was badly divided on how to apply the requirement in different contexts. Only five members of the Court
joined Justice Powell's opinion applying the new standard in
Arlington Heights; Justice White, the author of Davis, dissented.
The division within the Court was even more dramatic in
Castaneda, in which the Court for the first time found the necessary
discriminatory purpose, but only by a five-to-four vote with three
separate dissenting opinions, including one by Justice Powell. Only
Justice Blackmun joined the Court's opinion in all three cases.,
This article reviews the history of the purpose-effect controversy in the Supreme Court opinions and lower court decisions that
preceded Washington v. Davis and then analyzes the three recent
Supreme Court decisions to see how the discriminatory purpose
requirement has been applied and to identify the unresolved issues
in the application of the requirement to future equal protection
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of.Kentucky. B.A. 1967, Amherst
College; J.D. 1970, Harvard University. Professor Schwemm is co-counsel for the
plaintiffs in Arlington Heights.
1. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
3. 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
4. Justice Stevens also did not dissent from any of these decisions. He joined the Court's
opinion in Davis and in Castaneda and did not participate in Arlington Heights.
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cases. The introduction traces the background of the purpose-effect
problem and the significance of its resolution in Davis. The facts
and holding of Davis are then considered, followed by a review of
the relevant precedents, including those relied on or disapproved of
in Davis. The second half of the article is devoted to a detailed
analysis of the opinions in Davis, Arlington Heights, and
Castaneda, and examines the legal standard adopted, the application of that standard, and the major issues left unresolved by the
Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In deciding cases under the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court applies the now familiar "two-tier" analysis: state action is subjected to strict judicial scrutiny if it impinges on a
"fundamental right" or discriminates against a "suspect class," but
it need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest if
neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is involved.5 In
theory, the state can satisfy the strict scrutiny test by demonstrating that its action was necessary to advance a compelling state
interest.' In practice, however, the Court's determination that the
state has invaded a fundamental right or discriminated against a
suspect class is tantamount to a decision that the state has violated
the equal protection clause.7 On the other hand, if the state's action
adversely affects neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class,
the state's burden of justification under the "mere rationality"
standard is so slight that the Court almost invariably upholds the
action, no matter how unwise or imperfect it may be.'
5. E.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). But see Gunther, In Search of
Evolving Doctrine-A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAAiv. L. REv. 1 (1972); note
8 infra. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
6. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-93 (1964) (racial classifications in most circumstances are irrelevant
to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose).
7. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Gunther, supra note 5, at 8.
8. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court has,
however, given the "rationality" standard some teeth in certain contexts, such as in challenges to state laws that discriminate on the basis of sex, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), or on the
basis of legitimacy, compare Trimble v. Gorden, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977) with Fiallo v. Bell, 97
S. Ct. 1473 (1977) and Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). Some commentators have
suggested that an intermediate standard of review is being employed in these areas, see, e.g.,
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The critical issue in most equal protection cases, therefore, has
become whether a fundamental right or a suspect class is involved
at all. In resolving this issue in recent decisions, the Court has
focused its attention on two types of questions. First, it has defined
what rights are fundamental and what classes are suspect for purposes of equal protection analysis. Thus, the Court has accorded
fundamental status to criminal defendants' rights,9 interstate
travel, 0 voting," first amendment interests, 2 and certain uniquely
private rights, 3 but has denied this status to welfare benefits,"
housing, 5 education, 6 and public employment. The Court has recognized classifications based on alienage, 8 race," and national origin 2 as suspect, but has refused to scrutinize strictly classifications
based on sex, 2 ' legitimacy,22 wealth,2 or age.2 4 The process of identifying fundamental rights and suspect classes has led to the second
question in cases in which the rights of a suspect class are affected:
Gunther, supra note 5, passim, although the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized
that such a middle-level standard exists. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976).
9. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
10. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975).
11. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
12. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
13. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970).
15. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
16. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
17. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
The Court purported to explain why some rights are fundamental and others are not for
purposes of equal protection analysis in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973). According to Justice Powell's opinion, "the answer lies in assessing whether
[the right is] explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 33-34. If the
right is guaranteed, strict scrutiny is appropriate. If it is not, the right is not considered
"fundamental," and the rational basis test applies.
18. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
19. E.g., Loving.v.. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
20. E.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
21. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Johnson, Sex Discriminationand
the Supreme Court-1975,23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 235 (1975). But see note 8 supra.
22. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). But see note 8 supra.
23. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
24. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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how is a court to determine whether the challenged state action
actually discriminates against a well-recognized protected class,
such as a racial minority, for purposes of equal protection analysis?
Several Supreme Court opinions before Washington v. Davis
considered this second question, but none addressed the issue directly and the guidance provided by these opinions was sparse and
arguably inconsistent. 5 Clearly, as the Court noted in 1972 in
Jefferson v. Hackney, "unproved allegations of racial discrimination" will not suffice to invoke the strict scrutiny standard and thus
invalidate a racially neutral and otherwise legitimate law. 6 On the
other hand, in the course of striking down a city charter provision
banning enforcement of a local fair housing ordinance, the Court
indicated in 1969 in Hunter v. Erickson27 that a facially neutral law
that burdens minorities is as invidious for equal protection purposes
as a law that discriminates on its face. Two major school desegregation decisions of the early 1970's seemed to distinguish between two
groups of cases. In the first group proof of intentional discrimination
was unnecessary to establish an equal protection violation because
a segregated school system once had been mandated by law.2 8 In the
second group-cases of de facto segregation-proof that the segregated schools were caused by intentional state action was neces9
sary.

2

The importance of the question whether discriminatory impact
alone was sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny of a facially neutral law
without proof that the law was also racially motivated was heightened during this time by two developments. First,-civil rights groups
and litigants realized that the Supreme Court's willingness to strike
down state laws requiring racial separation in the aftermath of
Brown v. Board of Education" would not guarantee full and equal
opportunities to minorities. A variety of state actions that appeared
racially neutral could and did disadvantage those groups whose his25. For a more detailed review of these pre-Davis precedents, see text accompanying
notes 74-157 infra.
26. 406 U.S. 535, 547 (1972). In Jefferson, the Court upheld the Texas system of computing welfare benefits against a number of statutory and constitutional challenges. Rejecting
the equal protection claim, Justice Rehnquist's opinion for a five-man majority noted that,
absent proof that the system was "the result of racial or ethnic prejudice," the fact that the
least favored of Texas's four aid programs had a substantially larger percentage of minority
recipients than did the other programs did not require the system to meet the strict scrutiny

test.

Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.

393 U.S. 385 (1969).
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tory of deprivation made them the special concern of the equal
protection clause. As Professor Brest recently noted:
The first order of business in the era following Brown was to halt the
ongoing, pervasive, and often overt practices of discriminatory exclusion of blacks from schools, voting booths, jobs, restaurants, housing,
and the like. . . . By the late 1960's, the civil rights enforcement
effort had eliminated the most flagrant practices. Covert discrimination continued to flourish, however, and the very successes of the 60's
dispelled any notions that blacks would quickly become integrated
into the economic and social life of the nation."
The second development was the Court's hostile response in the
early 1970's to litigants seeking to attack "covert discrimination" by
expanding the list of rights regarded as fundamental under the
equal protection clause. If blacks generally received an inferior education, lived in lower quality housing, and depended more on public
assistance than did whites, then according a special status under
the equal protection clause to these basic needs would benefit blacks
indirectly. The suggestion of official discrimination against minorities that lurked in the background of many of these cases was therefore no accident.3 2 When the Court refused to extend fundamental
right status to housing, education, or any other human need and
determined that wealth was not a suspect classification, 33 the focus
of equal protection challenges to facially neutral laws that disadvantaged minorities narrowed substantially.
If the issue of what constituted discrimination against blacks
under the equal protection clause narrowed, the contexts in which
claims of discrimination arose did not. With little guidance from the
Supreme Court, lower courts struggled with numerous claims that
official acts affecting the availability of public services, employment, and housing denied equal protection because of their adverse
impact on minorities.3 4 Time and again, these cases required the
lower courts to decide whether a statute or official practice not
shown to be racially motivated nevertheless harmed a suspect class
because its impact fell more heavily on blacks than on whites. By
1976, when the Supreme Court decided to confront the purposeeffect issue directly in Washington v. Davis, it had become one of
31. Brest, In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as AntidiscriminationPrinciple].
32. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 15 n.38,
57 n.113 (1973).
33. See notes 14-17 & 23 supra.
34. See, e.g., cases cited in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976).
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the most controversial and important civil rights issues of the
decade.5
II.

Washington v. Davis

The plaintiffs in Washington v. Davis challenged the validity
of "Test 21," a written verbal ability test developed by the Civil
Service Commission for general use throughout the federal service,
which the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department
used to screen its recruits. Two black candidates for police positions
who had failed the test intervened in a suit originally filed by black
officers alleging that the promotion policies of the department were
racially discriminatory. The intervenors claimed that some of the
department's recruiting practices, including its use of Test 21, excluded a disproportionately high number of black applicants from
the force and thereby discriminated against them on the basis of
3
race in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights.
The Metropolitan Police Department required all applicants to
answer correctly at least forty of the eighty questions on Test 21, and
the failure rate of black recruits was over four times as high as the
3
failure rate of whites7.
The unsuccessful candidates moved for summary judgment on their constitutional challenge to Test 21, relying
solely on the test's "highly discriminatory impact in screening out
black candidates" and their allegation that the test results bore no
relationship to on-the-job performance; they.made no claim of
'
"intentional discrimination or purposeful discriminatory acts. "38
The defendants, who included the District of Columbia and federal
officials responsible for making appointments to the department,
also filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that the rejected
applicants were entitled to relief on neither constitutional nor statutory grounds.
The district court upheld the test.3 9 The plaintiffs' proof that
35. See Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 31, at 4-5.
36. Because the defendants were federal and District of Columbia officials, the basis of
the constitutional claim was the due process clause of the fifth amendment, which contains
"an equal protection component" prohibiting invidious discrimination by the United States.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
The plaintiffs and intervenors also relied on the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970), and on a District of Columbia statute, D.C. CODE § 1-320 (1973), both of which
prohibit employment discrimination based on race.
37. Among the police applicants who took Test 21 in the District of Columbia from 1968
to 1971, 57% of the blacks failed the test as compared to a failure rate of 13% for whites. Davis
v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
38. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972).
39. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972).
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Test 21 had not been validated in terms of job performance and that
the failure rate of blacks was substantially higher than that of
whites, along with the fact that the racial mix of the police force was
not the same as the racial mix of the city, was considered sufficient
"to shift the burden of the inquiry to defendants." 0 Judge Gesell
held that the defendants had met this burden, however, by showing
that forty-four percent of the successful applicants in recent years
were black, a figure approximating the racial mix of the recruiting
area, 4' and by showing that the department had made "a vigorous,
systematic, and persistent affirmative effort to enroll black policemen."42 Furthermore, the district court accepted the department's
arguments that its officers increasingly needed the verbal skills
which Test 21 purported to examine and that the plaintiffs' proposal
that the department either abandon the test or lower the passing
score would frustrate the department's legitimate interest in improving its professional standards. 3 Judge Gesell concluded that the
test was neither "designed nor operates to discriminate against otherwise qualified blacks"" and that "[tihe proof is wholly lacking
that a police officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than
ability." 5
The court of appeals reversed.46 In a two-to-one decision, it held
that Test 21's "racially disproportionate impact" placed a heavy
burden on defendants to prove that the test was related to actual
40. Id. at 16.
41. Id. The district court considered the relevant recruiting area to be within a 50-mile
radius of Washington, D.C. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the pertinent population
figures should be those of the city alone, where the proportion of blacks was much higher than
in the surrounding areas. See 512 F.2d at 960 n.24. The court of appeals declined to resolve
this dispute, finding it immaterial to the ultimate issue presented, and the Supreme Court
ignored the matter as well.
42. 348 F. Supp. at 17. Indeed, Judge Gesell even suggested that one of the reasons for
the higher black failure rate on Test 21 was that the department's affirmative recruiting
program had encouraged educationally deficient blacks to apply. Id. The court concluded
that "[tihe Metropolitan Police Department is a model nationwide for its success in bridging
racial barriers." Id. at 18.
43. Thus the district court did not view the issue presented in Davis as whether a
challenged practice could be held unconstitutional on the basis of its discriminatory impact
without proof that the practice was racially motivated. The trial court instead focused on

whether the test had been sufficiently "validated," that is, shown to be a fair test of those
skills actually needed by police officers. The opinion included only three citations, all of
which dealt with the validation of personnel tests in employment discrimination cases. These
cases supported Judge Gesell's finding that, although Test 21 had not been proven to be a
predictor of successful job performance, it was "reasonably and directly related to the requirements of the police recruit training program." Id. at 17.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 18.
46. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1977

job performance. Furthermore, the court held that the defendants
had not met this burden by introducing a "validation study" showing that the test was an accurate predictor of success in the department's recruit training program. Citing a number of recent decisions
invalidating employment tests with comparative failure rates for
blacks and whites less dramatic than Test 21's four-to-one ratio, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs had shown the racially disproportionate impact of Test 21 as a matter of law, even if the percentage
of blacks in the department reflected the racial mix of the overall
local population. The court maintained that evidence of the defendants' affirmative efforts to recruit black officers-indeed, the
whole question of the employer's intent-was irrelevant to the controlling issue, which was "the discriminatory effect of Test 21 itself.""
To support its holding that the racial effect of the test was
unconstitutional, the court of appeals relied on Griggs v.Duke
Power Co.4 In Griggs a unanimous Supreme Court held that the use
of a standardized intelligence test that disqualified a greater percentage of black job applicants than white applicants violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 despite the absence of any intentional discrimination by the employer. Although Title VII did not
apply to governmental employers until two years after the plaintiffs
filed their complaints in Davis,4" the court regarded the standards
set forth in Griggs as controlling both the constitutional and section 1981 claims, noting that "many decisions disposing of employment discrimination claims on constitutional grounds have made no
distinction between the constitutional standard and the statutory
standard under Title VH." 0
The heart of the court of appeals' opinion in Davis was the
court's conviction that an employment test adopted without any
intent to discriminate could nevertheless unfairly injure blacks. The
opinion noted that low scores on a generalized intelligence test
would disqualify otherwise qualified black applicants by reflecting
47. Id. at 960.
48. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court in Griggs decided that Title VII regulated the
objective consequences of employment practices and did not simply outlaw practices established for racial reasons. The Court held that once a plaintiff made a showing of discriminatory effect, the burden shifted to the employer to show that the discriminatory practice
"beads] a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was
used." Id. at 431. "If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance," the Court said, "the practice is prohibited." Id.
49. See 512 F.2d at 957 n.2.
50. Id.

No. 41

DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE

their segregated and inferior educational opportunities more than
their ability to be police officers.5 ' The court expressly chose the
phrase "racially disproportionate impact" instead of "discrimination" to avoid the pejorative connotations that were not warranted
52
by a purely statistical showing of Test 21's disparate racial effect.
The court even commended the department on the success of its
affirmative hiring efforts apart from the use of Test 21, but noted
that "it is self-evident that use of selection procedures that do not
have a disparate effect on blacks would have resulted in an even
greater percentage of black police officers than exists today.""
The court of appeals held that defendants had failed to justify
the exclusionary impact of Test 21, because the evidence did not
demonstrate that test results were related to successful performance
of a police officer's job. The defendants had submitted a 1967 Civil
Service Commission study showing a relationship between applicants' scores on Test 21 and recruits' scores on examinations given
during the department's training program. The court, however,
maintained that this study, far from validating Test 21, "prove[d]
nothing more than that a written aptitude test will accurately predict performance on a second round of written examinations." 54 Furthermore, the court denied that the test's relation to training performance was relevant, because training performance alone was of
little or no value in predicting effective job performance. 55
The court of appeals agreed with the trial judge that improving
professional standards was a legitimate departmental interest. Having concluded that Test 21 was not job related, however, the court
predicted that elimination of the test would not lower police
standards." The conclusion that Test 21's racially disproportionate impact involved the department in invidious discrimination
against blacks followed only because that impact was not the result
of job-related requirements. Hence, the basic thrust of the court
of appeals' opinion had a certain compelling simplicity: If use of
Test 21 hurt blacks more than whites and if it did not help the
department pick better police officers, then the equal protection
principle of the Constitution required that it be abandoned. 5

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 961.
Id. at 958 n.6.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 964-65.
Id. at 965.
This is not to say that the court of appeals treated the issue in Davis as a simple
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By the time Davis reached the Supreme Court, it seemed an
unlikely vehicle for major pronouncements on equal protection principles. Even the defendants did not dispute the applicability of the
Title VII-Griggs standards to the constitutional claim. 5 Instead,
their petition only raised the issue of the application of those
standards, in particular whether Test 21 was job related. Nevertheless, the Court determined that it should decide whether the
"effect" standard developed in Griggs applied to an equal
protection claim. On behalf of a seven-man majority, 0 Justice White
found that the case presented an appropriate occasion to "notice a
plain error not presented" 0 and concluded that because the standards for sustaining a claim of racial discrimination under the Constitution were more demanding than those under Title VII, the
judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. Although the
Court reaffirmed the Griggs holding that hiring practices that disqualified substantially disproportionate number of blacks and that
were not validated in terms of job performance violated Title VII
without a showing of discriminatory purpose, it held that "proof
of discriminatory racial purpose is . . . necessary in making out an
equal protection violation." 6'
one. On the contrary, one of the striking features of the majority's opinion was its analysis of
the huge number of recent precedents in discrimination suits against public employers, most
of which had been decided in the three years since the district court's decision. Many of these
cases also involved challenges to civil service tests in which the ultimate issue was often
whether the tests were job related, an issue that had caused substantial controversy both
before and after the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). See, e.g., Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under the Fair Employment Laws:
A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598
(1969); Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 72 COLUM.
L. REV. 900 (1972); Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in
Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691 (1968).
In Davis, the question of Test 21's validity as a predictor of successful job performance
divided the court of appeals. In his dissent, Judge Robb agreed with the trial court that the
department had met its burden by showing that the test was related to the requirements of
the police training program and argued that Test 21 on its face was a fair and reasonable test
of the verbal skills needed by a competent policeman. Thus, he accepted the standards by
which the majority evaluated both the legal bases of plaintiffs' claim and plaintiffs' proof of
discriminatory impact, including the premise that evidence of a significantly higher black
failure rate on the test shifted to defendants the burden of justifying use of the test by proof
that it was job related.
58. See 426 U.S. at 238 n.8, 249 n.15.
59. Justice Brennan filed a dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, in which he argued that
the plaintiffs should prevail on their statutory claim and that therefore decision of the constitutional issue was unnecessary. 426 U.S. at 256-70. Justice Stewart joined the Court's opinion
on the constitutional issue only. 426 U.S. at 252. Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion
and filed a separate concurring opinion. 426 U.S. at 252-56.
60. See 426 U.S. at 238; SuP. CT. R. 40(I)(d)(2).
61. 426 U.S. at 245.
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According to Justice White's opinion, a consistent line of the
Court's decisions dating back to Strauder v. West Virginia" as well
as sound policy considerations supported the requirement that a
claim of racial discrimination under the equal protection clause be
based on proof of discriminatory racial purpose. He found that the
Court's decisions on jury discrimination, racial gerrymandering,
school segregation, and other forms of discrimination "adhered to
the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a
law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced
to a racially discriminatory purpose." 3 The Court distinguished two
opinions written in the early 1970's-Palmer v. Thompson" and
Wright v. Council of Emporia6 -that had suggested that a showing
of racial effect would suffice to prove a violation of the equal protection guarantee, and the Court specifically "disagreed" with numerous recent lower court decisions "to the extent" that their focus on
discriminatory impact had ignored the requirement of a discriminatory purpose in finding an equal protection violation."6 In Justice
White's view, these decisions, although "impressively demonstrat[ing] that there is another side to the issue,"" were erroneous, because the Supreme Court had never "embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether
it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional
solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.""
In addition to distinguishing its prior equal protection decisions, the Court seemed to fear that dangerous consequences would
follow from the use of the disproportionate impact analysis in equal
protection litigation:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits
or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing stat62. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
63. 426 U.S. at 240.
64. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
65. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
66. 426 U.S. at 244 n.12. Justice Stevens specifically refused to express an opinion on
the merits of these cases, 426 U.S. at 254 n.*, 256, although he otherwise joined the majority
opinion, and Justice Brennan's dissent criticized this list of disapproved cases for its inclusion
of Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975),
which the Court had already determined to review in the next term. 426 U.S. at 257 n.1.
67. 426 U.S. at 245.
68. Id. at 239.
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utes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white.6 9
The Court noted that sales taxes, bridge tolls, license fees, and
minimum wage laws could be considered to have a disproportionate
impact on blacks.7 °
Applying the appropriate equal protection standard to the
claim in Davis, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had not
shown Test 21 to be a "purposeful device to discriminate against
Negroes."'" The test was racially neutral on its face, and the Court
found its use a rational means of upgrading the verbal skills required of police officers.72 Justice White did indicate that a law's
disproportionate impact might help prove the necessary discriminatory racial purpose-indeed, that it might suffice in some cases to
establish a prima facie case that would shift the burden of proof to
the government to show that legitimate, nonracial considerations
prompted its action.7 3 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the
higher black failure rate on Test 21 was insufficient to prove a discriminatory purpose, because the department's affirmative recruiting efforts, the high percentage of blacks in recent recruit classes
and the force in general, and the proven relationship of the test to
the police training program "negated any inference that the Department discriminated on the basis of race."7 4
11.

THE PURPOSE-EFFECT ISSUE BEFORE

A.

Davis

The Supreme Court Precedents

All seven justices who reached the constitutional issue in Davis
agreed that proof of discriminatory racial purpose was necessary to
establish an equal protection claim.75 This unanimity on so difficult
69. Id. at 248.
70. Id. at 248 n.14.
71. Id. at 246.
72. Id. at 245-46. The majority opinion also held that Test 21 satisfied all statutory
standards for test validity as well, because of its direct relationship to the police training
program. 426 U.S. at 248-52. Justice Stewart did not join this part of the Court's opinion.
426 U.S. at 252. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, arguing that Test
21 did not satisfy the statutory standards, because only proof that the test was directly related
to actual job performance could justify its discriminatory impact. 426 U.S. at 256-70. Because
the dissenters believed that the applicable statutes prohibited the department's use of Test
21, they found it unnecessary to address the issues raised by plaintiffs' constitutional claim.
For a discussion of the statutory issues involved in Davis, see Lerner, Washington v. Davis:
Quantity, Quality and Equality in Employment Testing, 1976 Sup. CT. Rov. 263.
73. 426 U.S. at 241-42.
74. Id. at 246.
75. See notes 59 & 72 supra.
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a matter was surprising, because the many courts of appeals that
had struggled with the same issue in recent years had almost always
expressed the opposite view.76
How could the lower courts have been so consistently wrong,
when, according to Justice White, a century of Supreme Court precedents demonstrated that discriminatory purpose, not effect, was
the touchstone of an equal protection violation? The answer is that
the Court had not been consistent in its treatment of illicit legislative purpose as a basis for challenging governmental action on constitutional grounds." Indeed, its opinions on this subject had been
confusing and contradictory, particularly in the civil rights field.7"
Despite the Davis opinion's assertion to the contrary, the Supreme Court decisions involving racial discrimination before Brown
v. Board of Education" shed little light on the purpose-effect issue.
Many of these decisions invalidated laws that were discriminatory
on their face, such as the West Virginia statute limiting jury service
to whites that was struck down in Strauder.s° Obviously, both the
purpose and the effect of such a law was to prevent blacks from
becoming jurors. Similarly, the administration of facially neutral
selection procedures that resulted in the total or almost total exclusion of minorities, whether from jury service s" or the opportunity to
76. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th
Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976,981 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-33 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458
F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (2d Cir. 1972); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971),
aff'd on rehearing en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org.
v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187,
1200 (D. Md.), aff'd in pertinent part sub. nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.
1973). But see Smith v. Troynan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934
(1976).
77. Legislative purpose as it is used in this context is different from the concept of
legislative purpose that a court often uses as an aid to statutory construction. See Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 121314 (1970).
78. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 99 [hereinafter cited as Legislative MotiveI; Ely,
supra note 77, at 1208-12.
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. Strauder v.-West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
81. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (limitation of no more than one black
grand juror on each panel); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (no black jurors in 30
years); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (no black grand jurors in 16 years or more); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (five black grand jurors in a seven-year period); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939) (no black grand jurors in 40 years); Hale v. Kentucky, 303
U.S. 613 (1938) (no black jurors in 30 years); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (no black
jurors in a "long number" of years); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904) (no black jurors);
Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900) (no black jurors); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880)
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run a laundry in a wooden building," discriminated in both purpose
and effect. Likewise, "grandfather clause" exceptions to voter qualification statutes were held unconstitutional during this period even
though their terms did not explicitly discriminate against blacks,
because "the standard itself inherently brings that result into existence."83 Thus, in the era governed by Plessy v. Ferguson,4 when
examples of official action involving blatant discrimination and discrimination that was "unmistakable, although . . . somewhat disguised ' 8 5 were not uncommon, the Supreme Court reviewed laws
that were both intended to, and did in fact, discriminate on the
basis of race. Consequently, these cases did not compel the Court
to distinguish between purpose and effect. Similarly, in the years
immediately following Brown v. Board of Education,"' the Court
used the equal protection clause to strike down laws that provided
on their face for segregated parks, 7 beaches,88 golf courses, 8 and
buses 0 without any inquiry into what it must have recognized as the
obvious purpose of these laws: requiring the impermissible result of
racial segregation in public facilities.8
(no black jurors); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (no black jurors). For a
discussion of the latest Supreme Court jury discrimination decision, Castaneda v. Partida,
97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977), see text accompanying notes 389-449 infra.
82. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). For a discussion of whether the
relevance of illicit purpose should turn on whether the government action is "legislative" or
"administrative," see Ely, supra note 77, at 1284-89 (concluding that it should not).
83. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364 (1915). See also Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
84. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
85. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 361 (1915).
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87. New Orleans City Parks Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
88. Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
89. Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
90. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
91. The Supreme Court decided many of these segregation cases after Brown by short
per curiam orders. The Court's method of disposing of these cases raised the question of
whether the ultimate basis for these decisions was that the challenged segregation did in fact
disadvantage blacks, see, e.g., Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421 (1960), or whether segregation was unconstitutional simply because it was intended
to hurt blacks, thereby causing them to be officially "stigmatized" as inferior citizens, an
injury distinct from any actual disadvantage they may have suffered as a result of the
segregation, see Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation, and the Friendly Critics, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 104, 113-15 (1961). Obviously, the answer had important implications for the
issue of whether the focus of an equal protection case should be on the purpose or the effect
of the law under review, see Ely, supra note 77, at 1293-94 n.265, but the Court did not specify
one or the other, and the commentators were in disagreement on the matter. Compare Black,
supra, with Heyman, supra. See also Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959); Pollak, Racial Discriminationand JudicialIntegrity:A Reply
to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
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Only after the full impact of Brown had come to be appreciated
by local officials was the Supreme Court called upon to examine the
basis for invalidating a state law that did not contain a racial classification on its face but was clearly designed to maintain segregation.
In 1960, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot," the Court reversed an effort by
the Alabama legislature to change the boundaries of the city of
3
Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure,"
which would have excluded almost all the city's four hundred black
voters, but none of its whites. Although Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, noted that the "result"9 4 and "inevitable effect"" of the change would be to discriminate against blacks, he also
spoke of illicit purpose: "[T]he conclusion would be irresistible,
tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white
and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to
deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote."" The Court's
answer to the state's argument that it had the power to redraw
municipal boundary lines was that "[a]cts generally lawful may
become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end."'
Four years later, in Griffin v. County School Board9 8 the Court
invalidated Virginia's "generally lawful" acts of allowing a county
to abandon its public schools and paying tuition grants to students
attending private schools, because the state had acted "for one reason, and one reason only: to insure . . . that white and colored
children in Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go to the same school."" Because the Virginia plan "was
created to accomplish. . . the perpetuation of racial segregation by
closing public schools and operating only segregated schools," Justice Black's opinion concluded that it "works to deny colored stu'0
dents equal protection of the laws."'
Neither Gomillion nor Griffin, however, established the Court's
preference for discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect as the
focus of judicial analysis of an equal protection challenge to a facially neutral law. Both cases involved state actions that were
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 341.
Id. at.347.
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
Id. at 231.
100. Id. at 232.
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clearly undertaken for racial reasons and that undeniably produced
discriminatory results, and the unanimous opinions in both cases
expressed concern over the unacceptable results of the actions as
well as their illicit purposes. Wright v. Rockefeller, 01 decided the
same term as Griffin, illustrated the Court's ambivalence about the
purpose-effect issue. In Wright the Court upheld the boundaries of
the Manhattan congressional districts against a charge of racial
gerrymandering, because plaintiffs "failed to prove that the New
York Legislature was either motivated by racial considerations or in
0 2
fact drew the districts on racial lines.'
During the second half of the 1960's, the Court continued to
leave clues, albeit inconclusive ones, as to the proper weight to
accord the purpose and the effect of state action that allegedly
discriminated against blacks. In Reitman v. Mulkey,"°3 California
voters had amended their constitution to guarantee homeowners the
right to sell or lease their property to anyone they chose. The Court
invalidated the amendment because it significantly encouraged and
involved the state in private housing discrimination. Justice
White's opinion for the five-man majority concluded that determining whether California had impermissibly involved itself in private
discrimination required
an assessment of the amendment's
"potential impact."'0 4 He adopted an approach that examined the
constitutionality of the amendment in terms of "its 'immediate
objective', its 'ultimate effect', and its 'historical context and the
conditions existing prior to its enactment.' ""' Although the new
provision did not include any express reference to race, it was
adopted soon after the state had passed a series of fair housing laws.
The Court maintained that both the "ultimate impact" and the
only conceivable purpose of the amendment were to nullify these
fair housing laws and to authorize private racial discrimination in
the housing market.0 8 On behalf of the four dissenters, Justice Har101. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
102. Id. at 56 (emphasis added). Despite this language, Professor Ely has concluded
that Wright "unmistakably embraced" the proposition that the Court would intervene only
if the challenged state action intended to distinguish on the basis of race, Ely, supra note 77,
at 1251, and Justice White's opinion in Davis relied on Wright as requiring purposeful discrimination, 426 U.S. at 240. This reading of Wright seems rather one-sided, and certainly
Justice White's suggestion in Davis that the dissenters in Wright also agreed that purpose
was controlling is hard to reconcile with Justice Douglas's argument in Wright that legislative motives are irrelevant. See 376 U.S. at 61-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
103. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
104. Id. at 380.
105. Id. at 373.
106. Id. at 374-76, 381.
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lan focused on the "general effect" of the amendment, 7 which he
found to be racially neutral. Moreover, Justice Harlan criticized the
majority for examining intent at all, arguing that "the grounds
which prompt legislators or state voters to repeal a law do not determine its constitutional validity. That question is decided by what
the law does, not by what those who voted for it wanted it to do."' 8
He conceded, however, that the amendment could be struck down
if there were "persuasive evidence of an invidious purpose or ef-

fect. ''109
The Court was less divided two years later in Hunter v.
Erickson,"0 when it struck down an amendment to the Akron city
charter requiring the approval of fair housing ordinances by referendum. The challenged provision covered any ordinance protecting
housing rights "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin
or ancestry,""' and Justice White's opinion noted that this explicitly racial classification made its discriminatory nature even more
apparent than that of the law invalidated in Reitman.I" The Court,
however, did not refer specifically to either the purpose or the effect
of the charter amendment, but rather examined the history of racial
segregation in Akron and concluded that although the referendum
requirement applied to all persons, "the reality is that the law's
impact falls on the minority.""' In a separate concurring opinion
joined by Justice Stewart, Justice Harlan explained the change in
his vote from Reitman by noting that the Akron provision had "the
clear purpose" of making it more difficult to enact legislation benefiting minorities." 4
The Court's decisions rejecting equal protection claims were
equally vague about the purpose-effect issue. For example, Justice
Stewart's opinion in Dandridge v. Williams,"5 which upheld a
Maryland welfare system that placed a dollar limit on AFDC
grants regardless of the family's size or its actual need, noted the
absence of any "contention that the Maryland regulation is infected with a racially discriminatory purpose or effect such as to
make it inherently suspect.""' During the same term, in Evans v.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 390.
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 391.
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
Id.at 387.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 391.
Id.at 395.
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Id.at 485 n.17.
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Abney," 7 the Court again seemed to rely on both intent and effect
in affirming the decision of the Georgia courts to return a segregated park to the testator's heirs rather than to force the park's
desegregation. Writing for the majority, Justice Black contended
that "there is not the slightest indication that any of the Georgia
judges involved were motivated by racial animus or discriminatory
intent of any sort in construing and enforcing Senator Bacon's
will.""' The effect of the Georgia decision was also nondiscriminatory, the opinion argued, because it
eliminated all discrimination against Negroes in the park by eliminating the park itself, and the termination of the park was a loss
shared equally by the white and Negro citizens of Macon since both
races would have enjoyed a constitutional right of equal access to the
park's facilities had it continued." 9
A possible resolution of the purpose-effect issue, suggested by
Justice Stewart's dictum in Dandridge, was that a law was unconstitutional if it involved either a racially discriminatory purpose or
a racially discriminatory effect. Congress had adopted this approach
in the Voting Rights Act of 1965.120 The Act restricts the changes
that an affected city can make in its voting practices to those
changes that are approved by the Attorney General or do "not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color."'"' Moreover, this disjunctive interpretation of the purpose-effect standard would be similar
to the "purpose or primary effect" test that the Court was then
developing in cases under the establishment clause of the first
amendment. '
Instead, the Court seemed to adopt an effect test in 1971 in
117. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
118. Id. at 445. But see id. at 452 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 445.
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1970).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970); see, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358 (1975).
122. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); text accompanying
notes 266-68 infra. The commentators, however, wanted it one way or the other, although they
disagreed about which approach was preferable. One commentator argued that the proper
question was whether the effect of a law, not its purpose, was prohibited, although illicit
purpose could serve as evidence of what the effect might be. Note, Legislative Purpose and
Constitutional Adjudication, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1887, 1893 (1970). "[Ilt should be quite the
other way around," argued Professor Ely in a major article on motivation in constitutional
law that appeared at about the same time. Ely maintained that when the context required
an examination of racial purpose or effect, purpose should be the constitutional point-inchief, with effect available merely as evidence of what the lawmakers intended. Ely, supra
note 77, at 1221 n.51.
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Palmer v. Thompson.12 3 By a five-to-four vote, the Palmer Court
upheld the decision of the Jackson, Mississippi city council to close
rather than desegregate its public swimming pools. The record included ample evidence that racial animus had motivated the closing. 2 4 The city had continued to maintain segregated parks, libraries, golf courses, and other public facilities long after the Supreme
Court had declared these practices unconstitutional. In 1962, after
Jackson's black residents won a declaratory judgment in their suit
to desegregate all of the city's public facilities, Jackson's Mayor
Thompson announced that "we are not going to have any intermingling" in the swimming pools and suggested that the city would
instead sell the pools or close them down.' 5 Throughout the next
year, the mayor made a number of other public statements about
Jackson's determination to retain segregation in its recreational facilities, and the fiN;e public swimming pools remained segregated,
four for whites and one for blacks. Jackson did not open the pools
in 1963. After the conclusion of the appellate proceedings in the
desegregation suit, Jackson integrated its other public facilities, but
the city council decided not to operate the pools on a desegregated
basis, claiming that it could not do so safely or economically. Three
pools closed permanently; the city sold one to Jackson State, a
predominantly black college, and returned the fifth to the YMCA,
which allowed only whites to use it.
Jackson's black citizens, seeking to compel the city to reopen
the pools on an integrated basis, filed a new complaint alleging that
Jackson, in violation of the equal protection clause, had closed its
swimming pools to avoid desegregating them. In rejecting this
claim, the Supreme Court decided that the accusation of illicit motivation was insufficient as a matter of law, because "no case in this
Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection

solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for

it.

' '128

Although Justice Black's majority opinion acknowledged that language in some of the Court's recent opinions, such as Griffin v.
County School Board'" and Gomillion v. Lightfoot,2' 8 suggested that
the motive or purpose behind a law was relevant to its constitutionality, he maintained that "the focus in those cases was on the actual
effect of the enactments, not upon the motivation which led the
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

403 U.S. 217 (1971).
This evidence is summarized in Justice White's dissent. Id. at 246-54.
Id. at 250 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 224.
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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States to behave as they did."' 2 9 Examining the "actual effect" in
Palmer, Justice Black concluded that the closing of the Jackson
swimming pools affected blacks and whites alike and thus did not
constitute a denial of equal protection. 3 '
Justice Black's rationale for preferring effect over purpose as a
method of analyzing equal protection claims was his concern about
the hazards of declaring a law unconstitutonal on the basis of its
sponsors' motives.' 3 ' Chief among these hazards was the difficulty,
if not the impossibility, of ascertaining the sole or dominant motivation for a legislative decision. The Jackson city council, for example,
may have decided to close the public swimming pools because of its
opposition to racial integration or because it believed the pools
could not be operated safely or economically under the circumstances or for some combination of these and other reasons. In addition,
Justice Black noted the futility of any attempt to invalidate a law
enacted for illicit reasons, because the governing body could simply
reenact it for different reasons.' 3 Thus, the Supreme Court's general
objection to judicial review of legislative motivation compelled it to
conclude in Palmer that the proper constitutional focus in an equal
protection claim was the actual effect, not the purpose, of the challenged state action.
129. 403 U.S. at 225. The Court's reading of Griffin and Gomillion as turning on effect
rather than purpose and its declaration that purpose was not relevant to judging an equal
protection claim were severely criticized by Justice White in the principal dissent in Palmer,
403 U.S. at 264-65, and by a number of commentators as well, e.g., Legislative Motive, supra
note 78, at 99-100; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 40, 95 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Term]. Justice Black was not the first, however, to conclude that
Gomillion was a case of discriminatory effect, not purpose. Three years before in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which the Court rejected a claim that the draft
card burning statute was unconstitutional because Congress had passed it to stifle dissent,
Chief Justice Warren warned against judicial inquiry into congressional motivation and
argued that Gomillion actually stood "not for the proposition that legislative motive is a
proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a statute
on its face may render it unconstitutional." Id. at 384.
130. This view that the termination of a segregated service has the same effect on blacks
and whites for equal protection purposes was reminiscent of Justice Black's position in Evans
v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970). Justice White, on the other hand, argued that the city's
decision operated unequally, because it "stigmatized" black citizens by expressing the
"official view that Negroes are so inferior that they are unfit to share with whites this particular type of public facility." 403 U.S. at 266. He also suggested that blacks would be deterred
from asserting their constitutional rights if officials could respond to a desegregation order
by closing public facilities, 403 U.S. at 269, which was another reason that the city's action
affected blacks more adversely than whites.
131. 403 U.S. at 224-25 (relying on United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
132. Id. at 225. In addition to the difficulty of ascertaining motivation and the futility
of invalidating an otherwise permissible law, two other objections to judicial inquiry into
legislative motives are "the disutility of invalidating what may otherwise be a perfectly good
law" and "the general impropriety of the inquiry." Legislative Motive, supra note 78, at 119.
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The Court's analysis of the record in Palmer, however, indicates
that the Court was not required to make a clear choice between
purpose and effect, and therefore its announced preference for effect
over purpose was more gratuitous than dispositive. Having expressed concern about the pitfalls of inquiring into the motives of a
legislative body, the opinion nevertheless proceeded to note that the
courts below had made just such an inquiry and that substantial
evidence supported the lower courts' conclusion that legitimate
safety and economic considerations governed the city council's decision. 33 Thus, according to the majority, the petitioners in Palmer
had failed to establish that either the actual effect or the purpose-at least the dominant purpose-of the closing of the Jackson
swimming pools was to discriminate against blacks. In contrast, the
dissenters adamantly maintained that both the purpose and the
effect of the decision were discriminatory.34
Although all of the justices may thus have been convinced that
both the purpose and the effect of Jackson's decision supported
their respective decisions, Palmer differs from previous Supreme
Court decisions in its determination to confront and resolve the
question of whether illicit racial purpose, apart from effect, could
establish an equal protection violation. The Court was badly divided on the issue, but the answer that the majority purported to
give was neither ambivalent nor vague: A law does not violate the
equal protection clause solely because those who voted for it were
racially motivated. Indeed, the majority held that the motive or
purpose behind a law is irrelevant to its constitutionality and that
the law must be judged only by its actual effect.
Despite the clarity of its opinion, the strength of Palmer as a
precedent was questionable. Only five justices joined the majority
opinion, and two of them, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, wrote separate concurring opinions that suggested that the
closing of swimming pools and similar recreational facilities were
governmental actions that the Court would examine less closely
than state action affecting more essential services such as educa133. See 403 U.S. at 225.
134. With respect to purpose, for example, Justice White's detailed review of the evidence led him to conclude that the plaintiffs had established the causal link between the
desegregation order and the pool closings, 403 U.S. at 254, and that the record did not support
Jackson's claimed interests in preserving order and saving money, id. at 259. In judging the
effect of the closings, he decided, as he had for the Court in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385, 391 (1969), that the impact of the city's facially neutral action in reality fell on the
minority, because closing the pools amounted to an official expression that blacks were
inferior and that their efforts to desegregate public facilities could result in complete loss of
those facilities. 403 U.S. at 240-41, 266-70.
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tion.'3 ' The concurring justices also expressed the fear that a decision against Jackson would require the city to operate the pools
indefinitely no matter how serious the financial burden became.'3
Their opinions thus foreshadowed two points that would arise again
in Davis and Arlington Heights. First, the concurring opinions suggested that the appropriate standard for evaluating an equal protection claim might vary with the type or significance of the law being
challenged. The dissenters vigorously objected, arguing that minority access to public recreational facilities should receive the same
constitutional protection as minority access to public schools.' 37
Nevertheless, the concurring justices indicated that they subjected
Jackson's decison to close its swimming pools to a lesser degree of
judicial scrutiny than would have been appropriate were a claim of
1 38
educational discrimination involved.
Second, the concurring opinions suggested that a court deciding
an equal protection claim must consider whether the relief requested might unfairly burden the defendants. The complaint
sought to have Jackson reopen its swimming pools and operate them
on a desegregated basis. The city, however, claimed that the pools
could not be operated economically. Both Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun expressed concern that if Jackson lost, the
Court's judgment would require the city to operate the pools at a
deficit for an indefinite period.' 39 This suggestion that the merits of
135. 403 U.S. at 227-28 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 228 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 233-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 261-70 (White, J., dissenting); id. at
272 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. Focusing on the inherent importance of the right asserted was not a novel idea in
equal protection analysis. See cases cited notes 9-17 supra. The view expressed by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun in Palmer, however, seemed to reflect more their sense
of the practical realities of local government than it did a well conceived legal judgment.
Nevertheless, they obviously considered the nature of the right harmed by official action
important to the resolution of the equal protection claim. Indeed, to the extent that they were
persuaded to join Justice Black's admonition against judicial examination of legislative motivation because of their desire to uphold Jackson's authority to terminate nonessential services, Palmer's determination that effect, not purpose, was to govern equal protection cases
might be thought limited to only certain types of discrimination claims.
139. 403 U.S. at 228 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Again, the concurring justices' position seemed to be based on what they believed were
the practical realities of municipal government. Their fears were obviously not quieted by the
dissents' response that requiring Jackson to reopen its pools under the facts presented here
would not prevent a city that acted for nonracial reasons from abandoning a previously
rendered service. See 403 U.S. at 259-60 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 273 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). It was intriguing that Palmer should raise, much less turn on, this dispute over
proper relief, because the issue in the case was whether the black citizens of Jackson were
being denied equal protection in the first place, not whether the court could fashion an

No. 4]

DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE

an equal protection claim might turn on whether the anticipated
relief could prove to be a financial hardship for the defendant
seemed a novel and premature consideration. Had petitioners prevailed on the merits and won a permanent injunction requiring
Jackson to operate the pools even in the face of substantial deficits,
the city would then have had ample opportunity to seek an adjust1 or to appeal
ment in the decree 40
its provisions. The Supreme Court
had, of course, already reviewed the scope and propriety of a number of equitable decrees designed to remedy equal protection violations, particularly in school desegregation cases.' Moreover, the
Court had often approved or required decrees that necessitated substantial expenditures by public defendants."'
When a complex question of relief in a school desegregation
case did reach the Court a year later in Wright v. Council of
Emporia,'4 3 the Court relied on Palmer in announcing that discriminatory effect, not purpose, governed its decision. The issue in
Emporia was whether the district court had acted properly in enjoining a city's withdrawal from a county school system that would
effective and fair decree to correct an admittedly unconstitutional condition. Id. at 226.
Ironically, relief had been an issue in the original desegregation suit, in which the district
court's denial of an injunction on the grounds that a declaratory judgment would be sufficient
had been the subject of an unsuccessful appeal by the plaintiffs. Id. at 248-49. The case that
reached the Supreme Court, however, called not for a determination of whether the subsequent decision to close the pools conflicted with the declaratory judgment, but whether the
decision to close violated the equal protection clause.
140. See id. at 273 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964). See also Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329-40 (1970) (jury
selection).
142. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969); cases cited note 141 supra. But see generally AntidiscriminationPrinciple, supra note 31, at 36. This is not, however, to belittle the concern expressed in the
concurring opinions in. Palmer. The Court's experience with cases of official discrimination
during this time increasingly involved it in difficult questions of relief which the concurring
justices may have sought to avoid. (The trend, however, was to continue. See, e.g., Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)). In addition, the
request by Jackson's black citizens that the pools, which had been closed to everyone in the
city, be reopened because of a history of segregation, may have suggested another highly
controversial and still emerging issue-the propriety of granting special preferences to racial
minorities-which the Court was not yet fully prepared to confront. See DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974); Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977). Nevertheless, the concurring
opinions in Palmer, added to the close vote by which the Court decided the case, undercut
the strength of the Court's holding that an effect test governed equal protection claims, at
least to the extent that correction of the state action challenged required an unusual affirmative decree.
143. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
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have impeded the process of court-ordered desegregation then underway in the county's schools. The court of appeals had reversed.
It evaluated the city's action on the basis of its "primary purpose"
and concluded that Emporia's primary purpose for creating its own
school district was to provide for better education, not to maintain
as much racial separation as possible in its schools.'44 In a five-tofour decision, the Supreme Court upheld the injunction. The Court
noted that its prior decisions did not support the "dominant purpose" test adopted by the court of appeals, and it cited Palmer for
the proposition that the attempt to find the dominant motivation
of a city council or school board would be difficult and fruitless.'
The Court concluded that judicial inquiry into legislative motivation was simply irrelevant, because the proper measure of any desegregation plan was its effectiveness and because the existence of
a permissible purpose could not sustain an action that had an impermissible effect. 6 Furthermore, Emporia's argument that its
benign purpose should have permitted it to withdraw its schools
from the county system was undercut by the district court's finding
that race was indeed a factor in the city's decision.' 47 Thus, the
Supreme Court's decision may be interpreted as involving discriminatory purpose as well as discriminatory effect. Still, the Court's
opinion in Emporia, as in Palmer, undertook to distinguish between
an approach that focused on effect and one that rested on motivation or purpose, and the Court specifically endorsed the former.' 48
The following term, the Court returned to the problem of deciding the merits of an equal protection claim in Keyes v. School Dis144. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570, 572, 574 (4th Cir. 1971).
145. 407 U.S. at 461-62.
146. Id. at 462.
147. See id. at 461.
148. Id. at 462. The equal protection violation on which Emporia was based was the
enforcement until 1969 of racial segregation in the county's school system. 407 U.S. at 459.
Thus, unlike Palmer, the issue before the Court was not whether the city's action amounted
to "an independent violation," but whether that action was inconsistent with the desegregation order that the district court had entered to correct the original violation. An indication
of the significance of this difference was the fact that the four dissenters in Palmer, who had
argued for the relevance of discriminatory purpose, joined with Justice Stewart to form the
majority in Emporia. The Court's decision to focus on effect rather than purpose in upholding
the injunction against Emporia was not, therefore, a precedent for how a court was to judge
a claim of official discrimination on the merits, as Justice White's opinion in Davis was to
note. 426 U.S. at 243. See also Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II); Ely, supra note 77, at 1289-91.
Emporia did, however, underscore the point made in Palmerthat determining the motivation
behind a legislative act was extremely difficult. It also showed that in the proper circumstances the Court would invalidate state action on the basis of its discriminatory effect, even if
the prescribed relief appeared to "lock in" the defendants to a system that they had legitimate reasons for wanting to change. But see 407 U.S. at 470.
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trict No. 1,' the first school desegregation case to reach the Supreme Court from outside the South since Brown v. Board of
Education was decided. 5 " The plaintiffs in Keyes alleged that the
Denver school system, which had never operated under any law
requiring racial segregation, was nevertheless segregated as a result
of the school board's manipulation of attendance zones, selection of
school sites, and adoption of a neighborhood school policy. The
plaintiffs conceded that because no statutory dual system had ever
existed, they were required to prove "not only that segregated
schooling exists but also that it was brought about by intentional
state action."' 5 The issue was whether the plaintiffs had to establish that the entire school district, or only the schools in one area of
the city had been intentionally segregated. The Court held that
proof that Denver had engaged in a policy of deliberate racial segregation in a substantial part of its system could serve to establish a
prima facie case that the entire system was unlawfully segregated.
Hence, at least "in the special context of school desegregation
cases,"' 52 Keyes indicated that in the absence of a history of officially mandated segregation, a necessary element of an equal protection claim was "purpose or intent to segregate."' 53 The parties,
however, never contested this issue, and the record did include evidence of discriminatory effect as well as discriminatory purpose
throughout the entire school system. 5 '
This review of the Supreme Court's analysis of discriminatory
purpose and effect in its equal protection decisions before Davis
149. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
150. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
151. Id.at 198.
152. Id.at 208.
153. Id.See generally Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent
and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976).
154. See, e.g., 413 U.S. at 203-04. Justices Douglas and Powell filed separate concurring
opinions in Keyes, arguing that the Court should not recognize any constitutional difference
between de jure and de facto segregation. Id. at 214-17 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 21753 (Powell, J., concurring). One of Justice Powell's reasons for preferring to base his decision
on the racial effect, not the purpose, of the school board's decisions was to avoid the difficulties that Palmer and Emporia had indicated were involved in the judicial search for segregative intent. Id.at 227. See also id.at 230-31, 233-35. An effect test, he argued, would better
ensure that there would be no place for racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise, in the
decisions of public school officials, id.at 227, because plaintiffs would not have to undertake
"the initial tortuous effort of identifying 'segregative acts' and deducing 'segregative intent,' "
id. at 224. A test based on purpose would not only make an equal protection case difficult to
prove, Justice Powell noted, it would also lead to "fortuitous, unpredictable and even capricious" results. Id. at 233. The same condition or decision that was justified by a legitimate
purpose in one case could be struck down as improperly motivated in the next, "especially
since the Court has never made clear what suffices to establish the requisite 'segregative
intent' for an initial constitutional violation." Id.
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suggests several conclusions. Justice White was correct in Davis
when he wrote that "our cases have not embraced the proposition
that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects
a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because
it has a racially disproportionate impact."'55 The conclusion that
should immediately follow this one, however, is that the Court had
not rejected this proposition either. Davis was the first case in which
the Court considered the merits of an equal protection claim on the
basis of "racially disproportionate impact" or discriminatory effect
alone. Only in Emporia did the record establish a segregative effect
resulting from an arguably nonracial purpose, but the infirmity in
Emporia was that the effect of the state action was inconsistent with
an outstanding desegregation order, not that this effect alone was
sufficient to establish an independent constitutional violation. In all
other cases, including Palmer,the majority claimed to be convinced
that both the purpose and the effect of the state action supported
its decision, whether that decision invalidated the action as involving a racial classification or upheld it as nondiscriminatory.
Nor did the language of the Court's various opinions resolve the
purpose-effect issue. Some opinions suggested that either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect violated the equal protection clause. Gomillion and Griffin invalidated state actions that did
in fact discriminate, but apparently on the ground that the actions
were "solely concerned" with maintaining racial segregation. Justice Black's opinion in Palmerthen "rewrote history"'5 by announcing that these decisions actually turned on effect. The majority in
Palmer maintained that the search for a sole or dominant purpose
was illusory in general and irrelevant in equal protection cases in
particular. Finally, in Keyes the Court held that segregative intent
must be proved in some school desegregation cases, but not in others. In light of this performance, the lower courts and litigants who
were then struggling with the purpose-effect issue might have been
more relieved than annoyed when the Court failed to make any
significant new pronouncements on the subject in 1974 and 1975. In
any event, Justice White's statement in Davis that the Court's precedents had not endorsed the plaintiffs' effect theory was just another way of saying that the justices had not yet resolved the matter
one way or the other. Precedent certainly did not clearly support the
Court's holding in Davis.
155. 426 U.S. at 239. See also Perry, The Disproportionateimpact Theory of Racial
Discrimination,125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 546 (1977).
156. AntidiscriminationPrinciple, supra note 31, at 27.
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B.

The Lower Court Decisions

*The question remains why the lower courts, if they were indeed
free of controlling precedent and subject to apparently conflicting
signals from the Supreme Court, so consistently used the equal
protection clause to invalidate employment tests and other official
actions on the basis of disproportionate racial impact.' 7 An examination of the lower courts' opinions suggests that the principal reason was that, at least in the employment discrimination cases, the
most relevant precedent was Griggs v. Duke Power Co.5 8 Although
the lower courts explicitly recognized that the Title VII standards
established in Griggs were not directly applicable to equal protection analysis,'59 the courts regarded the specific type of case as the
key to determining whether to focus on effect or purpose in judging
an equal protection claim. The manner in which the Supreme Court
had dealt with different kinds of racial discrimination cases in the
past appeared to authorize the lower courts' approach. If state action allegedly violated a prior desegregation order, for example,
Emporia established a clear preference for an analysis based on the
effect, not the purpose, of that action. Keyes, on the other hand,
held that to establish an equal protection violation in "the special
context of school desegregation,' ' 10 segregative intent was a necessary element, unless the segregation could be traced to a local law
that had once required racially separate schools. Evaluating cases
in which state officials discontinued public recreational facilities,
Evans v. Abney and Palmer called for yet another analysis. The
concurring justices in Palmer, for example, joined the majority's
determination to focus on effect rather than purpose in part because
they believed that substantial discretion should be accorded to
municipal decisions affecting such nonessential services. If state
action blocked laws beneficial to minorities, Reitman and Hunter
judged the action in terms of its immediate objective, ultimate impact, and historical context.' 6 '
157. See cases cited note 76 supra.
158. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
159. E.g., Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-33 (1st Cir. 1972); Wade v. Mississippi
Coop. Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126, 143 (N.D. Miss. 1974). See also cases cited in Davis
v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
160. 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
161. Another "special context" was the jury discrimination cases. Since 1880 the Court
has held that a criminal conviction cannot stand if the state has "deliberately and systematically" denied to members of the defendant's race the right to participate as jurors, see
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628-29 (1972), and no other area, including school
segregation, has provided the Supreme Court with so many opportunities to decide cases of
racial discrimination under the equal protection clause. See cases cited note 81 supra. Davis
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If the decisions of the Supreme Court did not help resolve the
purpose-effect issue, neither did the commentators in the law reviews. 6 ' Most commentators provided little guidance about the
proper roles of purpose and effect in equal protection analysis. Only
6 3 and
Professor Ely's article on motivation in constitutional law"
Professor Brest's rebuttal to Palmer v. Thompson"' provided any
helpful guidance about the proper roles of purpose and effect in
equal protection analysis, and they, too, agreed that: "The extent
to which a judicial determination of motivation is relevant to the
outcome of a case depends on the substantive doctrine in the particular area of law involved."' 65
If different standards governed each type of racial discrimination case, the lower courts could hardly be faulted for turning to
Griggs for guidance in judging equal protection claims brought by
minorities whose poor performance on standardized intelligence
tests disqualified them from public employment. Before Davis the
Supreme Court had not decided such a case, but its unanimous
opinion in Griggs held that a showing of racial purpose was unnecessary in a Title VII employment discrimination action. Under Title
VII a private company's use of an employment test that excluded a
markedly disproportionate number of blacks was unlawful, unless
relied on language from a number of the Court's opinions in jury discrimination cases indicating that they turned on discriminatory purpose, not merely the fact of minority exclusion.
426 U.S. at 239-41. Even if these opinions did focus on purpose, however, the Court developed
the principles governing these claims long ago-as Justice White, himself, pointed out four
years before Davis, see Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. at 628-29-in cases in which the
exclusion of blacks from jury service was either required by law or else was so overwhelming
that it clearly reflected both a racial purpose and a discriminatory effect. See cases cited note
81 supra. But see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). In any event, the point is that jury
discrimination claims, whether they turned on purpose or not, were to be governed by well
settled principles that had been established in previousjury discriminationdecisions. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. at 628-29.
162. See Legislative Motive, supra note 78, at 102.
163. Ely, supra note 77.
164. Legislative Motive, supra note 78.
165. Id. at 102 n.46. Professors Ely and Brest did differ, however, about which types of
racial discrimination cases should turn on illicit purpose. Professor Ely argued that purpose
is determinative only when the state must make a random or discretionary choice, e.g., jury
selection and redistricting cases. Ely, supra note 77, at 1261-75, 1281-84. Professor Brest took
the position that clear proof of discriminatory purpose could serve to invalidate a wider
variety of state actions, including the decision to close the public swimming pools in Palmer.
Legislative Motive, supra note 78, at 130-34. The point is not whether either Ely or Brest
provided a complete and accurate list of which types of discrimination cases turned on
purpose and which on effect, but rather that both agreed that the type of case could make a
difference in determining what the proper judicial focus should be. See also Perry, supra note
155 (arguing after Davis that discriminatory purpose should govern jury and redistricting
cases, but that a test based on discriminatory impact should apply to employment discrimination, exclusionary land use, and school desegregation cases).
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the company showed that the test was job related. Many of the early
appellate opinions that applied Griggs to discrimination claims involving government employment recognized the anomaly of holding
a public employer to a lower standard than that which the Supreme
Court demanded of a private company.' 6 The lower courts were
even more confident of the correctness of their conclusion that effect
governed claims of equal protection violations in government employment decisions after 1972, when Congress appeared to ratify
this position by amending Title VII to cover governmental employment.' 7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green"' in 1973 cited two of the lower
court decisions, Chance v. Board of Examiners'9 and Castro v.
7 0 along with
Beecher,'
Griggs to illustrate the purposes of Title VII.
The Court's action appeared to endorse those cases,'7 thus indicating that Title VII and equal protection standards for judging employment discrimination claims were the same."'
The early appellate decisions also relied on Griggs to establish
the defendant's burden of justification in an employment examination case. Chance and Castro, for example, noted that this burden,
which only required the employer to show that its test was "a reasonable measure of job performance,' 7 3 was much less demanding
than the compelling interest standard ordinarily triggered by racial
classifications under the equal protection clause."' Indeed, the
lower courts' reliance on Griggs was motivated in part by a desire
to uphold governmental employment practices that were job related
despite their disproportionate impact on minorities. '
166. Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 733 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners,
458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972). But see Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187,
1205 (D. Md.), aff'd sub nor. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973). See generally
Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1975).
167. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 211
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. V 1975)). See, e.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d
976, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
168. 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
169. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
170. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
171. Ironically, Davis specifically disapproved of both Chance and Castro. 426 U.S. at
244 n.12.
172. See, e.g., Vulcan Society v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 394 n.9 (2d Cir.
1973); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d
Cir. 1973).
173. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
174. Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 733 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners,
458 F.2d 1167, 1177-78 (2d Cir. 1972).
175. Id. Subsequent lower court decisions also focused on whether the challenged employment practice was job related, often without discussing whether or how this standard
compared with the rational basis or strict scrutiny tests of traditional equal protection analy-
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More importantly, the lower court opinions that Justice White
disapproved of in Davis, at least those involving the validity of a test
for public employment, showed a more sophisticated understanding
of the difficulties of judging an equal protection claim solely on the
basis of discriminatory effect than he gave them credit for. Aside
from his effort to read the Court's precedents as consistently turning
on discriminatory purpose in all types of cases, Justice White's only
reason for rejecting an effect test was his fear that such a standard
would invalidate minimum wage laws, bridge tolls, and a variety of
other government actions, unless the state could establish a compelling interest.' Justice White apparently feared that any law involving a standardized economic burden or benefit could be challenged
as racially discriminatory, no matter how legitimate its purpose,
because it was relatively "more burdensome to the poor and to the
average black than to the more affluent white.""' The lower court
decisions that preceded Davis did not provide any basis for this fear.
No reported decisions struck down bridge tolls because they had the
effect of discriminating against minorities. The horrors envisioned
by Justice White simply had not materialized. Moreover, in their
treatment of equal protection challenges to employment tests that
disproportionately disqualified blacks from public service-challenges that could hardly be considered farfetched after Griggsthe lower courts generally based their decisions on whether the
tests were job related. The courts indicated-often explicitlythat a finding of discriminatory effect did not necessarily result in
a demand for a compelling governmental justification in all cases.
The actions of the lower courts demonstrate that a discriminatory effect test need not open the floodgates to a wave of unprecedented equal protection challenges to racially neutral tax, welfare,
and regulatory laws if the standard for judging the government's
justification for these laws is flexible. The Supreme Court, however,
has refused to provide any flexibility in the standard for judging
claims of official racial discrimination. Under the Court's rigid twosis. E.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337
(2d Cir. 1973); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 736, 737 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Fowler v.
Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D. Minn. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 498 F.2d 143
(8th Cir. 1974). Actually, in view of the Supreme Court's holding in Davis that Test 21 had
been validated to meet the job-relatedness requirement, 426 U.S. at 248-52, its additional
conclusion that the test did not violate the equal protection clause was not necessarily inconsistent with these decisions. See, e.g., Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ohio 1975)
(rejecting an equal protection claim because the challenged test was shown to be job related).
176. 426 U.S. at 248.
177. Id.
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tier method of equal protection analysis, the state's burden of justification is generally governed by the rational basis test, but only a
compelling state interest can justify a law that is racially discriminatory, and the burden of establishing such an interest has proved
insurmountable. Obviously, the two-tier analysis, developed by the
Court in cases in which the challenged law created express racial
classifications,' 8 focuses entirely on whether the law involves racial
discrimination and then accepts or summarily rejects the state's
justification accordingly. Perhaps disregarding the justification for
a law was appropriate in an era when discriminatory state action
invariably reflected both an invidious purpose and an impermissible
effect. When the purpose is nonracial and only the effect is discriminatory, however, the courts could sensibly require that the justification for the challenged action be somewhat less than compelling on
the one hand, but greater than that demanded of a racially neutral
law on the other. This more flexible approach was not only the basis
for many of the lower court decisions that focused on the job relatedness of government employment tests,' 9 but also was adopted by
the Supreme Court in analyzing recent equal protection actions
involving sex discrimination and other newly emerging claims.'
Although the rigidity of the traditional two-tier approach had
prompted substantial criticism in the law reviews'8 ' and from within
the Court itself,'"" the Court continued to apply this method of equal
178. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
179. See note 175 supra.
180. See note 8 supra.
181. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57, 113-14 (1973):
In the two-tier analysis the Court must reach these results in order to avoid the
necessity of requiring a compelling state interest to justify the system. This problem
is a general one. Forcing the great range of personal interests into two polar categories,
fundamental and nonfundamental, and the great range of possible classification into
two other polar categories, suspect and neutral, makes it impossible for a court's
opinion to reflect subtle gradations and distinctions which cumulatively may have
been significant to the court in reaching its result. Because the opinion cannot display
the full grounds for decision, it seems strained and unconvincing.
See also Nowak, Realligning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L. REV. 1071, 1071-75
(1974); Perry, supra note 155, at 559-61; Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory
Effects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1977); Wilkinson, The
Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 950-53, 1017 (1975).
182. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317-21 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 574-76 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 62-63 (Brennan,
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protection analysis throughout the early 1970's, and it refused to
modify the analysis for racial discrimination claims in Davis. Thus,
the Court's fear in Davis of the far-reaching and inevitable consequences of an effect test was essentially self-induced, reflecting its
own failure to provide a sufficiently flexible form of equal protection
analysis for racial discrimination cases rather than any outrageous
83
decisions by the lower courts.'
Even under the traditional two-tier approach, however, the
Supreme Court's own decisions of the early 1970's indicated that the
Davis Court's fear of an effect test was groundless. First, in James
1 Jefferson
v. Valtierra,84
v. Hackney, 8 5 and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez'86 the Court established that state
action that was relatively more burdensome to the poor was not on
that ground alone racially discriminatory for equal protection purposes. In Valtierra, for example, the Court upheld a provision of the
California Constitution that required the approval of every low-rent
housing proposal by a community referendum. The Court simply
stated that the provision did not rest on distinctions based on
race." 7 The lesson of the Court's opinions that a classification based
on wealth does not automatically constitute proof of racial discrimination was not lost on the lower courts, 8 including those that focused on discriminatory effect. 189 Second, Palmer v. Thompson
showed that an effect test for racial discrimination claims under the
equal protection clause would not inevitably favor civil rights claims
over governmental interests. If the Supreme Court could decide that
the "actual effect" of closing the Jackson swimming pools was not
racially discriminatory, surely it could fashion an equal protection
J., dissenting); Vladis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 211-14 (Stevens, J., concurring).
183. But c. AntidiscriminationPrinciple, supra note 31, at 26, 52-53 (concluding that
an effect test is judicially unmanageable).
184. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
185. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
186. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
187. 402 U.S. at 141 (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)). The Valtierra
opinion does not explicitly adopt a purpose or effect test for judging racial discrimination
claims. It was written by Justice Black the same year that he delivered the majority opinion
in Palmer v. Thompson, thus suggesting that Valtierra employed an effect, rather than a
purpose test in deciding that the challenged provision did not rest on "distinctions based on
race."
188. See, e.g., Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087, 1093-94
(6th Cir. 1974); Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 362 F. Supp. 651, 658-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 507 F.2d 1065, 1068 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
189. See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d
409, 413 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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analysis based on discriminatory effect that would not invalidate
bridge tolls and sales taxes.' 0 The Title VII standard for judging
racial discrimination focused on effect according to Davis,'9' but no
one had ever suggested that Title VII prohibited a company from
paying equal wages to employees of all races on the ground that this
was more burdensome to the poor black than to the more affluent
white. An effect test might require more judicial attention to the
2
problem of defining just what constituted "discriminatory effect,"'
but Palmer showed that this type of approach could be applied
93
without ignoring legitimate state interests.'
If the lower courts' decisions applying the Griggs standard to
public employment discrimination cases posed no threat of an equal
protection clause out of control, perhaps it was their adoption of a
discriminatory effect test in other contexts that troubled the Court
in Davis. Justice White's list of disapproved cases included seven
decisions that relied on effect in analyzing claims of racial discrimination against zoning, public housing, and other official actions
outside the employment field,'94 all of which were decided without
the benefit of a Supreme Court precedent as pertinent as Griggs.
The opinions in these seven cases reflected the lack of controlling
or even helpful precedents by relying more on policy considerations
190. Indeed, the "pro-civil rights" justices in Palmer opposed the discriminatory effect
test as too restrictive, e.g., 403 U.S. at 241-43, 265 (White, J., dissenting), a fact of no little
irony in view of Justice White's opinion in Washington v. Davis. See generally Legislative
Motive, supra note 78.
191. See 426 U.S. at 246-48.
192. The task is long overdue, and the Court itself has contributed considerably to the
confusion over what "discriminatory effect" means by using a variety of terms to refer to the
effect,"
concept, see, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373, 380 (1967) ("ultimate
"potential impact"); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225-26 (1971) ("actual effect");
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 227, 232 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) ("effect");
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238, 239, 242 (1976) ("differential impact,"
"disproportionate impact"), and by failing to provide any reasoned basis for its definition of
"discrimination." See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). For purposes
of equal protection analysis, the task of defining "discriminatory effect" would be no more
difficult-and in light of the experience gained under Griggs, it might even be easier-than
the task of defining "discriminatory purpose."
193. The Court's decisions refusing to subject state welfare and state educational financing systems to strict scrutiny, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972), also demonstrated
that the Court would not permit equal protection analysis to result in undue judicial intrusion
into areas traditionally thought to involve substantial legislative discretion.
194. 426 U.S. at 244 n.12. Significantly, none of these cases involved school desegregation or jury discrimination, contexts in which the Supreme Court precedents arguably had
established a purposeful discrimination requirement. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). The lower courts apparently
did not extend their discriminatory effect analysis to these contexts, because they concluded
that the choice of an effect or a purpose test depended on the particular context involved.
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and the purposes of the equal protection clause than did the public
employment decisions, which were often decided exclusively on the
authority of Title VII employment discrimination cases.
Nothing in the disapproved decisions conflicted with Justice
White's observation in Davis that "[tlhe central purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race."' 95
Agreement concerning this general statement of purpose, however,
did not help resolve the issue of whether the only official conduct
violative of the equal protection clause was willful discrimination.'
The lower court opinions concluded that the purpose of the
equal protection clause could not be fulfilled unless the clause were
construed to prohibit conduct that had the effect of discriminating
on the basis of race. This conclusion' derived primarily from the
lower courts' view that the requirement of governmental neutrality
contained in the equal protection clause was not merely a restraint
on state action, but was also an affirmative guarantee of minority
equality.'9 7 Certainly purposeful racial discrimination is unconstitutional; if its vice lies in depriving blacks of certain rights and benefits, 9 ' however, then the equal protection clause arguably should
also invalidate all state action that disadvantages blacks, even if the
discrimination results from seemingly neutral requirements, such as
an employment test, or from the majority's unconscious neglect of
or indifference toward minorities. 9 As Professor Ely said in the
context of jury discrimination cases: "The harm which accrues to a
litigant from the underrepresentation of his race -on the jury which
sits in judgment on him is exactly the same whether the underrepresentation was achieved intentionally or unintentionally." ' °0
Moreover, focusing on the plaintiff's injury as opposed to the
government's intent in order to determine whether official conduct
is racially discriminatory for equal protection purposes was hardly
unprecedented. The Court in Palmer determined that the closing of
195. 426 U.S. at 239.
196. See Perry, supra note 155, at 548.
197. See generally Ely, supra note 77, at 1255-56; Perry, supra note 155, at 555-56.
198. But see notes 91 & 130 supra; Legislative Motive, supra note 78, at 109, 116 n.109;
Antidiscrimination Principle,supra note 31, at 9-11, 34.
199. The danger in such [suspect class] cases is not only that the legislature or
officials will act out of hostility or on the basis of assumptions of the inferiority of
the minority group, but also, and more likely, that they will fail to accord the same
weight to the burdens to be placed on minorities that they would were these burdens
imposed on their more powerful constituents.
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 H~Av. L. REv. 58, 120 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975
Term]. See also AntidiscriminationPrinciple,supra note 31, at 7-8, 14.
200. Ely, supra note 77, at 1257.
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the Jackson swimming pools was nondiscriminatory because it deprived whites and blacks alike of the same benefit.3' Similarly, even
before Palmer, a number of Supreme Court opinions had included
language that supported this view. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 2 for example, the Court held that a private restaurant that refused to serve blacks could not be permitted to
operate as part of a public parking facility. The Court announced
that "no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by
either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may be. It is of no consolation to an individual
denied the equal protection of the laws that it was done in good
faith. 20 3 As this statement from Burton implies, however, it is impossible to decide questions of minority rights under the equal protection clause without also considering what the corresponding
state responsibilities are. The issue of whether discriminatory
effect or discriminatory purpose should govern equal protection
claims thus involves questions concerning the government's duty
to accommodate the needs of minorities, which is one of the reasons that the purpose-effect issue has become so important in
2
recent years. 1
Traditionally, the equal protection clause has been thought to
require only that the states not act on the basis of race.2 5 No great
extension of this principle is involved in using an effect standard,
as Emporia did, to judge state action that allegedly perpetuates
past de jure segregation, which after all was racially motivated in
the first place. It is another thing, however, to subject all official
conduct that results in unintended racial discrimination to strict
scrutiny, because this would effectively require state officials to act
upon racial considerations to avoid violating the equal protection
clause. 20 Thus, strict scrutiny would require the abandonment of an
otherwise rational and appropriate employment test or zoning decision, for example, if it turned out to harm blacks more than whites.
201. 403 U.S. at 225-26.
202. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
203. Id. at 725.
204. See Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 31, at 4-5. The Supreme Court's
resolution of the purpose-effect issue under the equal protection clause at about the same time
that it has been called upon to consider the constitutionality of governmental affirmative
action programs is not entirely coincidental. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974);
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976),
cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
205. See generally Ely, supra note 77, at 1255-56; Perry, supra note 155, at 555-56.
206. Compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) with
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). See generally Ely, supra note 77, at 125569; Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of
Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363, 379-80, 382-83 (1966)..
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Consequently, officials could avoid judicial invalidation of their actions only by consciously considering the racial impact of those
actions.
The response of the lower court decisions disapproved of in
Davis was that officials should be required to consider the racial
impact of their decisions. Three of those opinions sounded this
theme explicitly by quoting from Judge Wright's classic statement
in Hobson v. Hansen:
The complaint that analytically no violation of equal protection
vests unless the inequalities stem from a deliberately discriminatory
plan is simply false. Whatever the law was once, it is a testament to
our maturing concept of equality that, with the help of Supreme
Court decisions in the last decade, we now firmly recognize that the
arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous to private
rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme. 07
Moreover, basing an equal protection decision on discriminatory effect does not raise all of the problems that are generally
associated with affirmative action. A requirement that the government take affirmative steps to undo the present effects of past discrimination would impose a different and substantially heavier burden than a requirement that government simply not act to exacerbate those effects, absent a compelling justification. 8 Although an
equal protection analysis based on effect would create difficult problems of relief, including the need for affirmative decrees, an analysis
focusing on purpose would not avoid these difficulties. In any event,
the lower court decisions that held official action unconstitutional
on the basis of discriminatory effect did not thereby violate the
neutrality principle that underlies the equal protection clause.' 9
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court was troubled by the specter
of affirmative action in Davis. Claiming to "have difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for
employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory,"' ' 10 Justice
White said that black candidates who failed the test had no more
of an equal protection claim than unsuccessful white applicants did.
How these statements could come from the same court that decided
Griggs v. Duke Power Co."' is baffling. The issue in both Davis and
207. 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (holding unconstitutional the de facto segregation that existed
in the District of Columbia schools).
208. See Perry, supra note 155, at 561-62.
209. But see id. at 556-57.
210. 426 U.S. at 245.
211. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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Griggs was whether the defendant's use of a racially neutral employment test that disproportionately excluded blacks "discriminat[ed] on the basis of race." 1 ' Griggs answered "Yes," concluding
that the lack of discriminatory purpose by the company was irrelevant. Davis answered "No," apparently finding the proposition
mystifying, if not indeed dangerously radical. The Davis Court
maintained that the standards for proving discrimination under
the equal protection clause and Title VII are different,2 13 but this
is simply a statement of the result the Court reached, not a reason
for making the distinction in the first place.
In Griggs, the Court focused on discriminatory effect in order
to implement Title VII's purpose of achieving equality of employment opportunities and of eliminating practices that operated to
perpetuate the effects of prior employment discrimination. 2 1 The
employment test operated to the disadvantage of the petitioners in
Griggs in part, the Court noted, because blacks generally had long
received inferior education in segregated schools." 5 Therefore Griggs
defined discrimination in terms of effect because the Court was
willing to view the plaintiffs not merely as injured individuals, but
as members of a disadvantaged racial group. The Court presumed
that the plaintiffs' poor performance on the test was directly tracea26
ble to past discrimination that their racial group had suffered.
The Court had taken a similar approach in earlier equal protection
cases, 21 as well as in some of its other decisions interpreting remedial civil rights legislation.2 1 8 The Davis Court, however, curtly dismissed the notion that their race entitled the unsuccessful black
applicants to any special consideration 28 and thus refused to consider one of the major reasons advanced in Griggs for analyzing
212. See 426 U.S. at 239. Compare id. with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
426 (1971) (construing Title VII, which prohibits discrimination "because of ... race").
213. 426 U.S. at 246-48. But see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
214. See 401 U.S. at 429-30.
215. Id. at 430. As Justice Powell subsequently wrote for a unanimous Court, "Griggs
was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative
and invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder of their lives." McDonnell-Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973).
216. The plaintiffs in Griggs made no showing that they themselves had actually received inferior educations as a result of having to attend segregated schools.
217. E.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (unanimous opinion by White,
J.); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See generally Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 31,
at 33-34.
218. E.g., Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (construing the Voting
Rights Act of 1965).
219. 426 U.S. at 246.
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discrimination in terms of effect rather than purpose.2 0
Despite the Court's concern in Griggs that facially neutral practices might perpetuate past discrimination, the opinion made clear
that the focus on discriminatory effect under Title VII need not and
should not require employers to take affirmative action on behalf of
blacks. Title VII did not "guarantee a job to every person regardless
of qualifications," wrote Chief Justice Burger, nor did it "command
that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject
of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.
Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed."2' Subsequent
Title VII cases demonstrated the Court's ability to judge discrimination claims on the basis of effect with substantial flexibility and
without endorsing discriminatory preferences or eliminating every
employment practice that arguably burdened a group protected by
the statute.2 Similarly, the lower court opinions that Davis repudiated did not contend that state action must affirmatively accommodate minority needs to comply with the equal protection clause
nor did they adopt a discriminatory effect test as a way of helping
blacks. Many of them cited Griggs, of course, but very few explicitly
relied on school segregation or other forms of historical deprivation
as a basis for their decisions.m
Nor did the lower courts appear to make much of the fact that
220. See generally Perry, supra note 155, at 557-59.
To what extent should laws employing no racial criterion but having a disproportionate
racial impact. . . be subject to a burden of justification heavier than mere rationality?
By definition, such laws disadvantage blacks to a greater extent than whites. The
degree of disadvantage is arguably less when discriminatory purpose is absent, because
a discriminatory purpose carries with it a stigma of racial inferiority. But surely the
disadvantage-for example, failure to get a job because of a poor performance on a
written examination-is serious nonetheless. It might be asked: Isn't the disadvantage
the same for a black person who fails an employment test as for a white person who
fails the same test? But the question misses the point. The relevant perspective is less
that of the disadvantaged individual than the perspective of the entire racial minority.
The disproportionatecharacter of the disadvantage, because it constitutes a severe
impediment to the racial minority in its difficult struggle to escape the legacy of
slavery and oppression and to achieve real social equality, is especially burdensome.
Id. at 558 n.99.
221. 401 U.S. at 430-31.
222. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
223. But see Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S.
229 (1976). In Davis, of course, there had been a long history of unconstitutional racial
segregation in the District of Columbia schools. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954);
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
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proving an equal protection claim was easier if effect were the key
instead of purpose, although this must have been apparent. 4 Indeed, little in the opinions of the lower courts supports Professor
Brest's suggestion that Palmer v. Thompson induced them "to conceal decisions based on discriminatory motivation in the guise of
disproportionate impact. ' 25 Although many of the sixteen cases
disapproved in Davis did include convincing evidence of racial purpose, the decisions focusing on discriminatory effect relied much
more often on Griggs than on Palmer. In fact, the only opinion
discussing Palmer's effect-oriented interpretation of the Supreme
Court's equal protection precedents was Judge Wisdom's concurring
opinion in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 221 which was also the only one
of the sixteen cases that, like Palmer, dealt with municipal services.
In light of Palmer's clear preference for judging equal protection
claims by effect and its admonitions about the difficulty of ascertaining legislative motivation, Justice Black's opinion may well
have affected the lower courts more than their opinions indicate,
but what is striking about their decisions is not how often they relied
on Palmer, but how rarely it was cited.
In summary, Justice White's fear that sustaining plaintiffs'
claim in Davis would open the floodgates to a torrent of equal protection litigation jeopardizing the most legitimate of state actions
on racial discrimination grounds was unjustified.2 2 Certainly the
performance of the lower courts whose opinions Davis rejected was
no cause for alarm. The Supreme Court's own equal protection cases
appeared to focus on effect or purpose depending on the type of
discrimination involved, and the decisions applying Griggs in public
employment cases were following the closest precedent available. In
judging employment practices that disproportionately excluded
224. Numerous legal scholars have noted the difficulties of establishing that racial
considerations prompted official action. E.g., Ely, supra note 77, at 1275, 1279, 1283, 1333;
Gunther, supra note 5, at 46-47. More importantly, the Supreme Court had relied on this
difficulty as an important reason for focusing on effect rather than purpose in Palmer and
Emporia.Justice Powell's concurrence in Keyes had also argued that a purpose test in school
desegregation cases would make the plaintiff's burden far more difficult. Furthermore,
Griggs, which vividly demonstrated the importance of the issue by sustaining a claim based
on effect that had failed below on the basis of purpose, had noted concern that a purpose
test might permit the continuation of covert discrimination. 401 U.S. at 435.
225. AntidiscriminationPrinciple, supra note 31, at 27.
226. 461 F.2d 1171, 1174-75 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J., concurring).
227. The "floodgates" argument should not be particularly persuasive in this context.
As Professor Ely has argued, "the observation that a constitutional doctrine will have farreaching implications cannot count as a refutation; whatever else we may or may not know
about the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it plainly was intended to make a difference." Ely, supra note 77, at 1256.

LAW FORUM

1000

[Vol. 1977

blacks by a job-related standard, many of these decisions provided
a more sympathetic way of evaluating government justifications
than was available under the traditional two-tier analysis. Indeed,
the flexible approach of the lower courts would have upheld the
employment test in Davis, if the Supreme Court had used that case
only to hold that the statutory standards of job-relatedness were
satisfied by a showing that the test predicted training school performance. Even if the Court maintained its rigid two-tier method
of equal protection analysis in all race cases, however, none of the
lower court decisions that focused on discriminatory effect either
endorsed or required preferential treatment for minorities or their
claims. First, Griggs clearly indicated that preferential treatment
would be inappropriate under an effect test. Second, bridge tolls
and sales taxes that applied to everyone were not being attacked as
racially discriminatory, nor was there any likelihood that they
would be, so long as the Supreme Court's effect analysis under
Griggs permitted equal pay for all employees. Finally, Palmer demonstrated that the Court could judge equal protection cases on the
basis of effect without unduly encouraging civil rights claimants or
ignoring legitimate governmental interests. In short, Davis undertook to settle one of the most important and complex civil rights
issues of the day by concluding that only purposeful discrimination
violated the equal protection clause in a case in which the issue was
not argued by the parties, in which its resolution was not necessary
to the Court's decision, in which the precedents appeared to conflict, and in which the only justification advanced to support the
Court's conclusion was an unrealistic fear of a purely theoretical
danger.22
IV.

THE PURPOSE REQUIREMENT APPLIED

The Supreme Court is now completely committed to a rule
requiring proof of discriminatory purpose in all types of racial discrimination cases under the equal protection clause. Only Justices
Brennan and Marshall did not join the Court's opinion on this issue
in Davis, arguing that the statutory issues made it unnecessary for
them to reach the constitutional question. Seven months later in
Village of Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development
Corp., however, they too endorsed the requirement that purposeful
228. For one of the more cryptic criticisms of Davis, see "Has the Supreme Court
Abandoned the Constitution," Saturday Review (May 28, 1977), 10, in which an official of
the ACLU Foundation argues that Davis is "perhaps the single worst decision in the past 80
years."
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discrimination is a prerequisite to an equal protection violation.29
Finally, in reversing a criminal conviction on jury discrimination
31 the entire Court agreed that the
grounds in Castaneda v. Partida,1
issue was whether the alleged discrimination was purposeful, although the five-to-four decision and five separate opinions showed
that there is substantial disagreement among the members of the
Court as to the application of the purpose requirement.
The lack of consensus that surfaced in Castanedais not surprising. Indeed, it is a fairly safe prediction that courts will be struggling
with problems concerning the application of the purposeful discrimination requirement for years. The requirement is new, at least in
many contexts,2 3 and as Justice Powell pointed out three years
before Davis, the Supreme Court has never made clear what suffices
to establish discriminatory purpose under the equal protection
clause.2 32 Professor Ely's study of motivation in constitutional law,
however, outlines the relevant inquiry:
Anyone who concludes that legislative or administrative motivation is sometimes relevant to constitutional questions will inevitably
become concerned with the methodology by which such motivation
is to be determined. Although I would think the effort ill-advised, one
might attempt to work out a detailed calculus for determining when
to refer to, and how much weight to attach to, the various evidentiary
sources: the terms of the law in issue, those effects which must have
been foreseen by the decision makers, the historical context in which
the law was passed, and233the legislative history and other recorded
statements of intention.
The rather off-handed tone of this passage was understandable in
1970, but after Davis, something of the effort he described is not
only advised in racial discrimination cases under the equal protection clause, it is required.
A.
1.

Washington v. Davis

The Legal Standard

Justice White's opinion in Washington v. Davis provides a
starting point for determining the showing necessary to establish
purposeful discrimination. Initially, he distinguished between laws
229.
part).
230.
231.
232.
233.

429 U.S. 252, 271-72 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
See cases cited in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976).
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 233 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
Ely, supra note 77, at 1220.
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that expressly create racial classifications and laws that are neutral
on their face, implying that those in the former category are presumptively the products of discriminatory purpose. 234 The fact that
the terms of the charter provision struck down in Hunter v. Erickson
referred to race played a critical role in his opinion for the Court
there, 235 and this factor could also serve to explain many of the
Court's other equal protection decisions from Strauder v. West
Virginia2 3-1 in 1880 to Loving v. Virginia in 1967.237
Laws that create express racial classifications are now rare, and
the significance of Davis for modern equal protection litigation lies
not in what the opinion says about these laws, but in what it says
about laws with facially neutral provisions. Justice White's opinion
indicates that discriminatory purpose will be difficult to prove in
these cases. Although the opinion acknowledges that the courts may
infer invidious purpose from a law's discriminatory impact and
other relevant-but unspecified-facts,2 13 the decisions cited in support of this proposition illustrate that the disparate impact on minorities must be overwhelming to permit an inference of discriminatory purpose. In one of the cases cited, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2 39 the
board of supervisors denied laundry licenses to every one of the two
hundred Chinese who applied, but permitted eighty non-Chinese to
conduct laundry businesses under similar conditions. All of the
other decisions struck down jury discrimination that either totally
or almost totally excluded blacks. For example, in the most recent
of these decisions, Alexander v. Louisiana,24 0 no blacks were on the
grand jury that indicted the defendant although over twenty-one
percent of the people in the county who were eligible for grand jury
service were black. " ' In his opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice
White noted that the probability that a truly random selection system would produce the exclusionary effect in Alexander was one in
twenty thousand. Hence, the Court held that the substantial dispar234. See 426 U.S. at 241. Whether government affirmative action-minority preference
programs violate the equal protection clause is beyond the scope of this article, see notes 142
& 204, but this part of the Davis opinion does suggest that such a program stands a better
chance of surviving judicial scrutiny if preferences are based on functional factors, e.g.,
previous conditions of poverty or poor educational opportunities, rather than race.
235. 393 U.S. 385, 389 (1969).
236. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
237. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
238. 426 U.S. at 241-42.
239. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In his concurring opinion in Davis, Justice Stevens noted that
the disproportionate impact in Yick Wo was so dramatic that it really did not matter whether
the equal protection standard was phrased in terms of purpose or effect. 426 U.S. at 254.
240. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
241. Id. at 627-28.
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ity between the proportion of blacks chosen for jury duty and the
proportion of blacks in the eligible population created a strong inference that racial discrimination, not chance, had produced the result.,,,
The Davis opinion's reliance on the jury discrimination cases
may indicate other characteristics of the proof necessary to establish
purposeful discrimination. The first has to do with the showing
necessary for a prima facie case. The jury decisions held that a
prima facie case of invidious discrimination was established if the
system of selection provided the opportunity for discrimination, for
example, by including a racial designation on the prospective juror's
information card, and if the degree of minority exclusion was striking. 2 3 This showing, according to Alexander, shifted "the burden of
proof. . . to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional
action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria
and procedures have produced the monochromatic result. 2 44 The
Davis opinion quoted this passage, 245 thus suggesting that proof of
discriminatory impact might satisfy the purpose requirement in all
types of racial discrimination claims under the equal protection
and is not explained on nonracial
clause if the impact is substantial
2 46
grounds by the government.
The jury discrimination decisions also held that the state could
not rebut a prima facie case simply by claiming to have acted 2 in
247
good faith. In Whitus v. Georgia and Alexander v. Louisiana, 1
both cited in Davis, the Court held that the testimony of a jury
commissioner that no consideration was given to race during the
selection procedure was insufficient to defeat a prima facie case of
systematic exclusion. As Justice White wrote in Alexander: "The
result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious
249
decision on the part of any individual jury commissioner."
242. Id. at 630 & n.9.
243. See, e.g., id. at 630-32; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 361 (1970); Eubanks v.
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958).
244. 405 U S. at 632.
245. 426 U.S. at 241.
246. For a similar approach in the context of school desegregation, see Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-10 (1973). As Justice Stevens cautioned in his concurring
opinion in Davis, however, "the burden of proving a prima facie case may well involve
differing evidentiary considerations" in the various types of equal protection claims that
might arise. 426 U.S. at 253.
247. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
248. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
249. Id. at 632 (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954)). See also Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210-13 (1973). "[fIt is not enough, of course, that the
school authorities rely upon some allegedly logical, rationally neutral explanation for their

1004

LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1977

The Davis Court's reliance on the jury discrimination decisions
raises the issue of how the court could find purposeful discrimination if the officials responsible for the challenged state action did not
consciously discriminate. The answer seems to be that Justice
White's understanding of the discriminatory purpose requirement
calls for an objective assessment of the law rather than a subjective
analysis of the lawmaker's motives. He does not discuss this distinction explicitly in Davis, but, even apart from his reliance on the jury
discrimination cases, it is suggested by his opinion in a number of
ways. The Davis opinion always used the word "purpose," or one of
its derivatives, to describe the type of discrimination that a plaintiff
challenging state action must establish. This careful and consistent
usage contrasts sharply with the Court's previous equal protection
opinions, which often used "purpose," "intent," and "motive" as if
the terms were synonymous.2 50 The only time that Justice White
referred to motivation was when he distinguished Palmer v.
Thompson as holding not that discriminatory effect could establish
an equal protection violation, but "that the legitimate purposes of
the ordinance-to preserve peace and avoid deficits-were not open
to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were actually
' 2'
motivated by racial considerations. 1'
The procedural posture in which the Court decided Davis also
suggests that "the totality of relevant facts ' 5 2 that permits an inference of purposeful discrimination is primarily an objective, nonmoactions. Their burden is to adduce proof sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent
was not among the factors that motivated their actions." Id. at 210.
250. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198, 210, 213, 232 (1973)
("intentional," "deliberate," "purpose"); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971)
("motivation," "motives," "purpose"); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970)
("motivated," "intent"). But see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 390-91, 395 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (legislators' "intent" distinguished from law's "purpose").
There may be little real difference for purposes of constitutional adjudication between
the concepts of a law's "purpose" and the lawmakers' "motives" in enacting it. See generally
Ely, supra note 77, at 1217-21. The Davis opinion's care in speaking only of purpose, however,
suggests a difference in the type of evidence to which these two concepts refer, with "purpose"
connoting objective facts and "motive" implying the subjective feelings of the lawmakers.
251. 426 U.S. at 243. Justice White, of course, dissented from this holding in Palmer,
403 U.S. at 242-43, but he also argued there that reliance on evidence of motive was unnecessary to find that the prior desegregation order, not legitimate purposes, prompted the decision
to close the pools. Id. at 254-55, 258-60. A similar theme was apparent in his opinions for the
Court in Reitman and Hunter, which examined the laws struck down in those cases in terms
of their immediate objective, ultimate effect, and historical context, not on the basis of
evidence of the motives of the individual electors and legislators who voted for the laws.
Indeed, in a case such as Reitman, determining the individual motives of all, or even a
majority of, the citizens who voted for the challenged law would be nearly impossible. But
see Legislative Motive, supra note 78, at 124 n.144.
252. See 426 U.S. at 242.
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tivational matter. The district court decided Davis on cross motions
for summary judgment. Each side had supported its position with
sworn affidavits. Neither side had presented witnesses. Ordinarily
in these circumstances, summary judgment is inappropriate if the
defendants' motives are a material and disputed element of the
cause of action.253 Although the plaintiffs never claimed that racial
motivation had prompted the use of Test 21,54 the Supreme Court
did not reject their claim because of a failure in pleading or because
of the absence of any evidence concerning the subjective state of
mind of the responsible police officials. Instead, Justice White undertook to review and assess the objective facts of the case that he
considered significant in order to determine whether Test 21
"reflects" a racially discriminatory purpose."
Perhaps the most important of these objective facts in Justice
White's view was that the test served a legitimate purpose that the
defendants were constitutionally empowered to pursue. "It is untenable," he wrote, "that the Constitution prevents the Government
from seeking modestly to upgrade the communicative abilities of its
employees rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of competence, particularly where the job requires special ability to com2 5 Justice Stevens,
municate orally and in writing.""
who sought in
his concurring opinion to rely even less on subjective evidence than
the Court did, was also influenced by the fact that Test 21 served
the neutral and legitimate purpose of requiring all applicants to
demonstrate a minimum level of reading ability, a skill that he
57
considered "manifestly relevant" to police work.
The fact that the discriminatory action resulted from an acceptable, even laudable, government purpose made Davis readily
distinguishable from Reitman, in which the state had no interest in
encouraging private housing discrimination, and from the jury discrimination cases, in which the state's interest in the initial selection procedures was merely to produce the needed number of prospective jurors on a purely random basis. 58 Similarly, the pivotal
issue in Palmer was whether the city's decision to close the pools
served any nonracial purpose. Justice White's dissent in Palmer
253. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); Denny
v. Seaboard Lacquer, Inc., 487 F.2d 485, 491 (4th Cir. 1973); Pettit v. Gingerich, 427 F. Supp.
282, 288 (D. Md. 1977).
254. See 426 U.S. at 235, 237.
255. Id. at 239, 245-46.
256. Id. at 245-46.
257. Id. at 254.
258. See Ely, supra note 77, at 1261, 1263-65.
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argued that the record did not support Jackson's claims of possible
violence and financial loss,209 but the concurring opinions of the
Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun indicated that the city had
sufficient discretion to pursue what the justices believed were its
legitimate interests.2 0 A similar concern influenced the Court to
uphold the Texas system of computing welfare benefits against a
v. Hackney,2 6' a decision
racial discrimination challenge in Jefferson
22
twice.
that the Davis opinion cited
As Palmer demonstrates, conceiving a legitimate purpose for
any state action is usually possible, no matter how strong the evidence is that racial motivations prompted the action. One of the
reasons that the Supreme Court was so badly divided in Palmerwas
that it had traditionally accepted the proferred justifications for
state action unless they were clearly a sham. Indeed, Professor Ely's
1970 review of the Court's decisions concluded:
Whenever the Court . . . has set for itself the question whether
a choice was generated by a rational and otherwise inoffensive criterion on the one hand or an unconstitutional one on the other, it has
'concluded that the illegitimate motivation has not been convincingly
shown,63 sometimes in the face of substantial evidence to the con2
trary.
Ely noted that part of the Court's reluctance to find a constitutional violation when state action appeared to involve both an illicit
and a legitimate purpose could be traced to its earlier efforts to
determine whether the improper purpose was "dominant, ' 264 an effort that Ely regarded as misguided and unduly restrictive. 215 The
Davis opinion does not state whether the necessary discriminatory
purpose must be the dominant basis in order for the state action to
violate the equal protection clause. Two relatively minor points
made by Justice White, however, suggest that the presence of any
nonracial governmental purpose may defeat any equal protection
claim. First, in arguing that Palmer had actually focused on purpose, not effect, he read Palmer to hold that evidence of racial
motivation on the part of the Jackson officials could not impeach
259.

403 U.S. at 254-55, 258-60.

260. Id. at 227-30.
261. 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972). See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973).

262. 426 U.S. at 240-41, 244.
263. Ely, supra note 77, at 1275.
264. Id. at 1266-67.
265. Id. at 1266-68; see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265-66 & n.11 (1977).
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the city's legitimate purposes of preserving peace and avoiding deficits. The implication is that Palmer not only survives Davis, but
that its holding, as reinterpreted, protects state action that serves
a legitimate governmental interest, even if racial considerations also
clearly motivated the action. Second, in arguing that Palmer did
not mean that legislative purpose was generally irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, the Davis opinion cited another 1971 decision, Lemon v. Kurtzman.6 ' In Lemon the Court reviewed an establishment clause challenge to state aid programs for parochial
schools on the basis of a three-part test. One part of the test examined whether the programs had a secular purpose. Justice White's
reliance on Lemon and other decisions involving public aid to
church-related schools to demonstrate the Court's willingness to
inquire closely into the purpose of a challenged statute is misleading, however, because the Court's acceptance of the government's
alleged secular purpose has become largely pro forma in these
cases."6 7 Recent decisions invalidating school aid programs on establishment clause grounds invariably find that at least one of their
purposes is constitutionally permissible, but proceed to hold that
they fail to meet one of the other two requirements of the test: that
the program's primary effect must not be to advance religion and
that it must not result in excessive entanglement between government and religion." 8 Of course, the very fact that these two other
independent grounds are available may explain why the Court's
analysis of legislative purpose in establishment clause cases has
been so superficial. Nevertheless, if Justice White intended to suggest that this type of analysis was appropriate in equal protection
litigation after Davis, establishing the necessary discriminatory
purpose will be impossible in all but the most egregious instances
of racial discrimination.
2.

The Legal Standard Applied

Even if racial discrimination need not be the sole or the dominant purpose of state action to violate the equal protection clause,
266. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (cited in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.11 (1976)).
267. See Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid
to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1175, 1178-81 (1974); 1975 Term, supra note 199, at 135 n.16.
268. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
For the exception that proves the rule, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating a state statute that prohibited the teaching of evolution on the ground that the law's
purpose was to enforce fundamentalist religious beliefs in violation of the first amendment).
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establishing a violation on the basis of discriminatory impact will
still be extremely difficult if the state action challenged serves some
legitimate governmental interest. In Davis, the task was impossible.
The police department had no history of de jure discrimination, the
test did not discriminate on its face, and most of the other traditional indicators of racial purpose were absent as well. The Court
was not experienced at examining facially neutral government actions for evidence of discriminatory purpose, and what experience
it had did not involve subtle forms of discrimination. The records
in the jury discrimination cases and in Gomillion, for example, were
"tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration" that the decisions invalidated were based solely on race.269
In other cases decided by the Court, the timing of the challenged
actions indicated racial purpose, either because the official actions
appeared to be taken in response to recent desegregation orders, as
in Griffin, or because they sought to invalidate recently enacted
civil rights laws, as in Reitman and Hunter.
In contrast, the record in Davis contained nothing suspicious
about the timing or other "legislative history" of the department's
decision to use Test 21. The plaintiffs based their entire racial discrimination claim on the fact that the failure rate of black applicants was four times as high as the failure rate of whites. Justice
White stated that "[elven agreeing with the District Court that the
differential racial effect on Test 21 called for further inquiry,""" the
evidence did not warrant the conclusion of purposeful discrimination. Specifically, he stated that the facts that the police department had affirmatively recruited blacks, that the racial composition
of recent recruit classes and the force in general roughly reflected
the population mix of the overall area, and that the test predicted
training school performance negated any inference that the use of
Test 21 discriminated on the basis of race for equal protection purposes.
Although the Court relied on both subjective and objective factors to reach this conclusion, these facts supported two essentially
objective conclusions that favored the defendants. First, they
greatly reduced the significance of the discriminatory impact of
Test 21 as proof that the department's overall employment practices
discriminated against black candidates as a group. As the district
court had said, the higher black failure rate might be traced in part
to the department's affirmative recruiting program, which had at269.
270.

See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
426 U.S. at 246.
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tracted many applications-from poorly qualified blacks.,
The
proper perspective, Justice White implied, was the department's
overall procedures for hiring police officers. The fact that these
procedures, including the use of Test 21, produced a recruit class
that was forty-four percent black in a recruiting area that was also
forty-four percent black hardly established a racial effect substantial enough to suggest discriminatory purpose. The second point
favoring the defendants was the validation study showing Test 21's
relationship to the police training program. This study buttressed
the department's claim of a legitimate purpose for Test 21 by
establishing that the test actually served the purpose for which it
was used. Thus, the goal of improving police oral and writing skills
was not merely an unsupported rationalization for discriminatory
action, as Justice White had viewed the city's justifications in
Palmer.
These two facts also seemed to be at the heart of Justice Stevens's concurring opinion. Rather than relying on the defendants'
affirmative recruiting efforts or any other evidence of their subjective good faith, Justice Stevens based his decision to uphold Test
21 on two "objective" considerations. First, the test served a legitimate governmental purpose. Second, the evidence of racially disproportionate failure rates for Washington, D.C., police applicants
could not alone overcome the presumption that Test 21, which was
widely used throughout the federal service, was in fact racially neu2
tral in its effect as well as its purpose.
Thus, the specific factors that both the Court and Justice Stevens believed negated any inference of purposeful discrimination in
Davis reinforced the earlier indications in Justice White's opinion
that two crucial elements of a claim based on discriminatory effect
are the overall size and significance of that effect and the legitimacy
of the government's alleged nonracial purpose. Ironically, if the
Supreme Court had adopted an effect test outright, the Court would
consider the same objective facts, because the result of a finding of
racial discrimination is only the application of a more exacting
standard for evaluating the state interest involved. Under the purpose test of Davis, on the other hand, the question of whether the
government in fact pursued a legitimate interest comes in the "front
door" during the initial determination of whether the plaintiff has
established racial discrimination. Because the Court's inflexible
271. 348 F. Supp. at 17.
272. For another statement of Justice Stevens's view that the courts should determine
discriminatory purpose on the basis of objective evidence, rather than on the basis of the
subjective motivation of the officials involved, see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 97 S.
Ct. 2766, 2776 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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two-tier method of equal protection analysis has made the determination of racial discrimination decisive, the Davis approach provides a better opportunity to consider the governmental interests
involved in a racial discrimination case, and no doubt the Court's
concern for legitimate governmental interests influenced it to adopt
the discriminatory purpose test.
The deficiency in the analysis suggested by Davis is that it
accords undue deference to the government's justifications for actions that in fact discriminate against minorities. Thus, even
though the evidence in Davis supported the conclusion that the
purpose of Test 21 was legitimate, the department actually may
have decided to use the test because it secretly desired to limit the
number of black recruits. Certainly the department should have
known that standardized intelligence tests often eliminate disproportionately high numbers of blacks.13 Consequently the department's use of Test 21, whether or not the department was also
concerned with reading skills, could conceivably have involved a
discriminatory purpose. Interestingly, Justice White never contended that the opportunity for racial discrimination was absent in
Davis, as the Court had done in rejecting equal protection claims
in Jefferson v. Hackney7 4 and San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez.25 In any event, although the existence of a
discriminatory purpose is possible in a case like Davis, proof of the
illicit purpose may not be, particularly if the responsible public
officials are careful to create a proper "legislative history" for their
decisionY1 Indeed, if Justice White's reinterpretation of Palmer v.
Thompson survives, even incriminating public statements would
not establish a racial purpose, if the government is able to show that
its action also served a legitimate interest.
Surely the Court must have been aware in Davis that governmental action "is frequently the product of compromise, of collec' and that to uphold
tive decisionmaking and of mixed motivation"2 77
actions that involve a permissible as well as a racial purpose would
273. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Douglas v. Hampton, 512
F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Federal Service Entrance Examination, which, like Test 21, was
developed by the Civil Service Commission and was used generally throughout the federal
service, see 426 U.S. at 234, shown to have a disproportionate impact on blacks).
274. 406 U.S. 535, 547-48 (1972).
275. See 411 U.S. 1,51 n.108 (1973).
276. See generally Legislative Motive,supra note 78, at 125-26. Legislators have learned
to do this to circumvent first amendment limitations on state aid to religious educational
institutions. See cases cited note 268 supra; 1975 Term, supra note 199, at 135 n.16 (1976).
277. 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
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permit racial considerations to influence official decisionmaking.
One response to this concern is for the Court to consider only objective factors in searching for discriminatory purpose, and Justice
White's opinion implied that this was the proper approach. Justice
Stevens was even more definite in favoring a purely objective review. Noting that it was "unrealistic . . .to require the victim of
alleged discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the
decisionmaker, ' ' 5 his concurring opinion argued that objective evidence of what actually happened was usually more probative than
evidence about the actor's state of mind, because "normally the
actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his
deeds.""'
This simple torts maxim may be tremendously important in
future equal protection litigation. The maxim's presumption has
already proved a powerful weapon in school desegregation cases, in
which the element of racial intent has been found on the basis of
acts, "the foreseeable consequence of which is segregation."' '8 0 Not
every showing of discriminatory effect, however, will shift the burden to the government in accordance with the maxim's presumption.aI Justice Stevens himself was careful not to advocate any general rules about proof in these cases, 8 2 and, more importantly, only
his opinion, not the Court's, proposed the presumption. Although
Justice White's discussion of the prima facie case concept considered a similar burden-shifting device, the opinion implied only that
a showing of a substantial discriminatory effect would shift the
burden to the government. After going to such lengths in Davis to
establish discriminatory purpose as a general requirement under the
equal protection clause, the Court is unlikely to permit that requirement to be presumptively satisfied in all contexts by a showing of
23
discriminatory effect.
Although the focus in Davis on objective evidence may help
278. 426 U.S. at 253.
279. Id.
280. Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 51 (2d Cir. 1975); see
Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976); Arthur v. Nyquist, 429 F. Supp. 206,
210-11 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1976). But see
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 97 S.Ct. 2766 (1977); Austin Independent School Dist. v.
United States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1976).
281. But see 1975 Term, supra note 199, at 120-21 (1976).
282. See 426 U.S. at 253-54.
283. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977). See also Butler v. Cooper,
554 F.2d 645, 647 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th
Cir. 1977); Guardian Ass'n of the N.Y. City Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 431 F. Supp.
526, 534-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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equal protection claimants to establish their claims, it hardly guarantees the success of all claims challenging racially-based state actions, especially if those actions also appear to serve legitimate government interests. Moreover, equal protection claimants face even
greater problems of proof in challenges to state action that is essentially negative in character, such as a decision to close public swimming pools or to block a proposal that would benefit minorities. The
Supreme Court considered a claim of this character in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.84
B.

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.

1. Background
In Arlington Heights, the Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation (MHDC) sought to build 190 townhouse apartments for
low- and moderate-income tenants under a federal subsidy program
in the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois. Arlington Heights is a
Chicago suburb that in 1970 had a population of 65,000 people,
99.9% of whom were white. Forty percent of the eligible applicants
for MHDC's proposed development were likely to be black and
Mexican-American, thus increasing Arlington Heights' minority
population by over one thousand percent." 5 The site chosen for the
development was part of an eighty-acre parcel on which the Clerics
of St. Viator, a Catholic religious order, maintained their novitiate
and a high school. The Viatorians had optioned a vacant fifteen-acre
corner of this property at a low price to permit MHDC to build the
first units of subsidized housing in the village. The entire Viatorian
property, as well as all of the land surrounding it, was zoned for
single-family purposes, so in 1971 MHDC applied to the village for
rezoning of the development site to a multiple-family classification.
The Arlington Heights Plan Commission held three public hearings
to consider the MHDC proposal. The hearings drew large, demonstrative crowds, and the debate focused not only on the zoning aspects of the proposal, but also on the "social issue"-whether racially integrated subsidized housing was desirable at this location
in Arlington Heights.28 After the plan commission recommended by
a divided vote that the zoning change be denied, the village's board
284. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
285. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 414
(7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
286. 429 U.S. at 257-58.
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of trustees held a public hearing on September 28, 1971, and voted
six-to-one to deny the rezoning petition.
The following June MHDC and three black prospective tenants
of the development sued Arlington Heights and its board of trustees. 87 The plaintiffs alleged that the village's refusal to permit
MHDC to build the subsidized apartments violated various constitutional and statutory provisions, including the equal protection
clause and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,255 because the
purpose and the effect of the refusal to rezone was the perpetuation
of racial segregation in Arlington Heights. The principal relief
sought was an injunction preventing the village from interfering
with construction of the proposed development." 9
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds, inter alia, that the plaintiffs lacked standing. After the
district court denied this motion, the plaintiffs filed their answer,
and a year of discovery ensued. During the course of discovery, the
plaintiffs deposed one of the trustees and asked her why she had
voted against the proposal. She refused to answer, claiming that her
motives were privileged. After the question of privilege was certified
and briefed, the district court upheld the defendants' position on
the authority of Palmer v. Thompson and United States v.
O'Brien.9 The court made the same ruling when the case went to
trial in January 1974, and, consequently, the plaintiffs offered "no
direct evidence by which to determine the motive or mental processes of the trustees."2 9 ' The district court noted, however, that
"motives are irrelevant if the effect is illegal,"29' 2 citing Gautreaux
v. Romney,23 one of the cases that Davis was to disapprove of two
years later. Nevertheless, the court ruled for Arlington Heights. It
held that the Fair Housing Act was inapplicable to the facts of the
case2 94 and that the other constitutional and statutory provisions
relied on by plaintiffs prohibited racial discrimination but not dis287. The individual plaintiffs sought to maintain the action as a class action, but the
district court declined to certify the class. Id. at 258 n.3. The trial court did allow a second
nonprofit organization and a Mexican-American individual to intervene as plaintiffs. Id. at
258-59. '
288. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
289. See 517 F.2d at 411. The complaint also sought, inter alia, money damages and
attorneys' fees.
290. See the district court's "Decision on Plaintiffs' Discovery Motions" (July 10, 1973),
printed in Appendix, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., No. 75616, at 62-63 (Oct. Term 1975).
291. 373 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. II. 1974). See also Trial Transcript at 161-63.
292. 373 F. Supp. at 210.
293. 448 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1971).
294. 373 F. Supp. at 209. But see note 324 infra.
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crimination against the poor.2 5 The court also commented on the
circumstantial evidence concerning racial motivation. It found that
although large groups of local residents opposed MHDC's development because of opposition to minority or low-income groups, the
plaintiffs had not shown that this consideration motivated the trustees, who in fact had been "motivated . . . by a legitimate desire
to protect property values and the integrity of the Village's zoning
296
plan."
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed.397 Proceeding in what the Supreme Court later
called "a somewhat unorthodox fashion,'' 9 8 the court ignored the
statutory issues and focused exclusively on the equal protection
claim. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that,
regardless of the village board's motivation, the refusal to rezone
would be unconstitutional if it had a racially discriminatory effect,
absent a compelling state interest, 29' but unlike the district court,
it concluded that the plaintiffs had established a discriminatory
effect. The court of appeals found that the village's decision would
have a disproportionate impact on blacks. Although blacks constituted only eighteen percent of the population of the Chicago metropolitan area, they made up forty percent of the area's low- and
moderate-income residents who were eligible for the MHDC development and were thus affected by the village's decision. Citing
3
James v. Valtierra,
00 however, the court held that this disparity
alone did not establish racial discrimination violative of the equal
protection clause, and it proceeded to assess the village's decision
"not only in its immediate objective but its historical context and
ultimate effect."'
The historical context included the facts that Arlington Heights
had grown from a small village in 1950 to the most residentially
segregated city in the Chicago area among municipalities with over
50,000 residents; that the village's spectacular and highly segregated growth patterns paralleled those of the suburban area where
it was located, which from 1960 to 1970 had also taken some 100,000
jobs from the City of Chicago; and that Arlington Heights had never
permitted or supported any subsidized housing within its borders,
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

373 F. Supp. at 210-11.
Id. at 211.
517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
429 U.S. at 271.
517 F.2d at 412-13.
402 U.S. 137 (1971).
517 F.2d at 413; see 429 U.S. at 260 n.6.
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even though the massive growth in its area had created a desperate
302
and growing need for low- and moderate-income housing there.
With one judge dissenting, the court of appeals also found that the
ultimate effect of the village's refusal to permit construction of the
MHDC development was to block the only opportunity to have any
subsidized, integrated housing in Arlington Heights and thus to
perpetuate massive residential segregation in the area. ' "' Arlington
Heights had an affirmative duty to alleviate this problem of de facto
housing segregation, the court maintained; the fact that the village
had "so totally ignored its responsibilities in the past" contributed
to the court's conclusion that the rejection of the MHDC proposal
34
had "racially discriminatory effects.' '
The court of appeals then analyzed the village's claimed justifications for its decision and held that neither maintaining the integrity of the zoning plan nor protecting neighboring property values
were compelling interests for equal protection purposes. The village's "buffer policy" provided that multiple-family zoning would
only be permitted adjacent to a single-family neighborhood if it
served to buffer that neighborhood from a different type of zone,
such as a commercial area. The defendants argued that granting the
MHDC petition would violate the integrity of the plan, because
single-family residences were located on two sides of the proposed
site, but plaintiffs maintained that their development could be considered a buffer against the Viatorian buildings on the other two
sides. More importantly, the plaintiffs argued that the buffer zone
policy was a "sham." Although the village used the policy to justify
its denial of MHDC's petition, the village had regularly ignored the
policy in approving some sixty prior zoning changes -for commercial
apartment developers. The court of appeals reviewed the evidence
concerning the village's decisions on these other rezoning petitions
and determined that the village had applied the buffer zone policy
in some commercial cases and overlooked it in others. 05 Thus, although the evidence did not require the conclusion that the village
would have approved MHDC's proposal if the petition had been for
market-rate apartments, the inconsistency shown by the village's
prior decisions indicated that its interest in applying the buffer
policy was not "compelling. '3°1 Moreover, the court noted, the planning rationale behind the buffer policy would have only minimal
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See 517 F.2d at 411, 413-15.
Id. at 414-15.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 415.
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applicability to the low-rise, open-space development planned by
MHDC, because the proposed townhouses were similar to the adjacent single-family homes in terms of density, architecture, and
other characteristics. These facts also led the court of appeals to
discount the asserted reliance of local homeowners on the buffer
policy and thus to hold that the village's concern for diminished
property values also was not compelling.
The Supreme Court granted the defendants' petition for
certiorarion December 15, 1975.07 The case was briefed and set for
argument later in the term, but the argument date was subsequently moved from April to October 1976. In the meantime, the
Court delivered its opinion in Washington v. Davis, which listed the
appellate decision in Arlington Heights among those lower court
308
decisions that the Court disapproved of.
Thus, despite their victory below, the plaintiffs in Arlington
Heights came to the Supreme Court with a heavy burden. In addition to Davis, they confronted two other lines of adverse Supreme
Court precedent. First, the Court had historically accorded great
deference to municipal zoning decisions. In the fifty years since it
upheld the constitutionality of zoning laws in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. ,30,the Court only once held that a local zoning decision
violated the fourteenth amendment, and that was in 1928.310 During
most of these years, the Court simply refused to hear any zoning
cases, but when it returned to the field in the 1970's it continued to
defer to the decisions of zoning authorities. 3 1 In 1974 in Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas3'2 the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance that restricted land use to one-family
dwellings. Justice Douglas's opinion for seven members of the Court
held that "[wie deal with economic and social legislation where
legislatures have historically drawn lines which we respect against
the charge of violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the law be
'reasonable, not arbitrary' . . . and bears 'a rational relationship to

a [permissible] state objective.'

",3,3

He found the objective of the

Belle Terre ordinance permissible, and therefore constitutional,
rhapsodizing:
307. 423 U.S. 1030 (1975).
308. 426 U.S. at 244 n.12.
309. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
310. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). See also Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
311. See generally Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and a Reluctant Supreme Court, 13
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107 (1977).
312. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
313. Id. at 8.
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A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. . . . The police power is not confined to
elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. 3"'

The second line of unfavorable precedent confronting the
Arlington Heights plaintiffs was the series of decisions in which the
Supreme Court refused to consider the poor the equivalent of racial
minorities and therefore declined to apply strict scrutiny to state
actions that discriminated against them.1 5 As the Seventh Circuit
recognized in Arlington Heights, these decisions meant that the
village's action preventing the MHDC development did not require
a compelling justification simply because blacks would constitute a
high number of the low- and moderate-income persons who would
be eligible for the development." ' Of course, a zoning ordinance
would be unconstitutional if it expressly created racially segregated
areas," ' but the Supreme Court had indicated that a challenge to a
zoning decision that prevented the construction of low- and
moderate-income housing just on the basis that a disproportionate
number of those in need of such housing were minorities was another
matter." '
314. Id. at 9. Even Justice Marshall, the lone dissenter on the merits, agreed
that zoning is a complex and important function of the State. It may indeed be the
most essential function performed by local government, for it is one of the primary
means by which we protect that sometimes difficult to define concept of quality of life.
I therefore continue to adhere to the principle of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926), that deference should be given to governmental judgments concerning
proper land-use allocation.
Id. at 13. He argued, however, that deference did not require judicial abdication and that
courts should not permit land-use controls to be employed "as a means of confining minorities
and the poor to the ghettos of our central cities." Id. at 14.
315. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
316. Nor would the Court subject the zoning decision to strict scrutiny on the ground
that it impinged on the plaintiffs' right to housing, because housing is not a fundamental
interest under the equal protection clause. See 429 U.S. at 259 n.5 (citing Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56 (1972)).
317. E.g., Buchanon v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
318. The Supreme Court's antagonistic attitude toward challenges to exclusionary zoning decisions was evident in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Worth, the five-to-four
decision of the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to an exclusionary
zoning ordinance of a wealthy Rochester suburb on standing grounds because "their inability
to reside in Penfield is the consequence of the economics of the area housing market, rather
than of respondents' assertedly illegal acts." Id. at 506. The same five justices who made up
the majority in Warth (Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist) were also the
only ones to find for the defendants on the merits in Arlington Heights, lending some support
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Finally, the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights confronted
Washington v. Davis. The parties submitted an additional round of
briefs discussing the implications of the Davis decision. In an effort
to distinguish their case from Davis, the plaintiffs argued that they
had always claimed that the village's decision was the result of
purposeful discrimination and that the record supported that contention.3 1 9 Specifically, they argued that the community's racial
hostility to the MHDC proposal, not zoning considerations, caused
the trustees to deny the rezoning petition.32 0 The trustees' decision,
as the court of appeals' analysis of its historical context and ultimate effect demonstrated, reflected a determination to maintain
residential segregation in the area, which satisfied the Davis requirement of discriminatory racial purpose. 2 '
None of the justices agreed. In an opinion for five members of
the Court, Justice Powell first rejected the argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing3 2 and then held that they "simply failed to
carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor in the Village's decision. ' '33 He concluded by remanding the case to the court of appeals for consideration of plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Housing Act. 324 Justice Stevens, who had
sat on the Seventh Circuit when it decided Arlington Heights, did
not participate.32 1 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the Court's decision on standing and in its discussion of
to Justice Douglas's assertion in Warth that the majority read this type of complaint "with
antagonistic eyes." Id. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
319. Respondents' Reply to the Petitioners' Supplemental Brief at 7, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Reply
Brief] (copy on file at the office of the University of Illinois Law Forum).
320. [Pletitioners' review of Lincoln Green was clearly not directed toward the
merits of the proposal because all of the professional evidence that was produced
favored it, all of the suggestions of the Arlington Heights' staff and Plan Commission
were incorporated into the Lincoln Green plans, and petitioners never received nor
even asked for the professional opinion of their own zoning and planning expert regarding the proposal (App. I 68; Tr. 114-115). What petitioners did respond to was the
overwhelming, hostile, unprecedented reaction of the community against Lincoln
Green, which often involved racially explicit statements and which, the Village President stated, was "a mandate to reject this proposal."
Reply Brief, supra note 319, at 7-8.
321. Id. at 3-10.
322. 429 U.S. at 260-64 (distinguishing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)).
323. 429 U.S. at 270.
324. On remand, the court of appeals reaffirmed its earlier holding that the village's
refusal to rezone had a racially discriminatory effect and held that the effect would suffice to
establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act if no other suitable land was available in
Arlington Heights for the MHDC development. It then remanded the case to the district court
for a determination of this question. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
325. 429 U.S. at 271.
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the discriminatory purpose requirement.2 Both justices dissented,
however, from the Court's application of that requirement to the
plaintiffs' equal protection claim, arguing that the case should be
remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent
with Davis. Justice White also favored remand of the equal protection claim in a separate dissent in which he criticized "[t]he
Court's articulation of a legal standard nowhere mentioned in
Davis. .... "I
2.

The Legal Standard
Justice Powell's articulation of the applicable
legal standard
did expand on what had been said in Davis, although the most
important thing about Arlington Heights wa's its affirmation that
the discriminatory purpose requirement of Davis applied to all types
of racial discrimination claims under the equal protection clause.
Justice Powell addressed some of the questions about the requirement that the Davis opinion left open, perhaps because he believed,
as he had four years earlier in Keyes, that the Court had never made
clear what was necessary to establish discriminatory purpose for an
328
initial equal protection violation.
First of all, he stated that "Davis does not require a plaintiff
to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. ' '32 Justice Powell recognized, as had Justice Stevens's concurrence in Davis, that a legislative or administrative
decision is often the consequence of numerous competing considerations and is rarely the result of a single, or even a "dominant" or
"primary," purpose. He noted that removal of even a "subordinate"
purpose may shift altogether the consensus of legislative judgment
supporting a law,3 ° and he concluded that "racial discrimination is
not just another competing consideration. When there is a proof
that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the

decision, ...

judicial deference is no longer justified.

' 33 '

326. Id. at 271-72.
327. Id. at 272.
328. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 233 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
329. 429 U.S. at 265. But see text accompanying notes 262-68 supra.
330. 429 at 265 n.ll (citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973)).
331. 429 U.S. at 265-66. Accord, Ely, supra note 77, at 1266-68; Legislative Motive,
supra note 78, at 116-19, 128, 130-31. According to Professor Brest,
[ilt is incorrect to pose the question of motivation: did the decisionmaker make this
decision to serve legitimate or to serve illicit purposes . . . . It is entirely possible that
he had both objectives in mind, but the rule should be invalidated if the illicit objective
played any material role in the decision.
Id. at 119 n.123. Thus, a complainant should prevail if he proves "that illicit motivation
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Nevertheless, Justice Powell maintained that proof that a decision was motivated in part by a discriminatory purpose does not
necessarily invalidate that decision, but only shifts to the defendant
"the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered."33' 2
Justice Powell's justification for this conclusion, however, is not
convincing. He argued that if the same decision would have been
made in the absence of any discriminatory purpose, the decision did
not cause any injury to the complaining party. This completely
ignores the concern that the Supreme Court has often shown for the
stigma that official discrimination imposes on blacks.333 As Professor
Brest has said: "A member of a minority group does have a complaint against being subjected to the opprobrium emanating from
334
even a 'good' decision adopted for discriminatory reasons.
One explanation for Justice Powell's view on this point is that
he failed to distinguish between the showing necessary to establish
an equal protection violation on the one hand and the appropriate
relief after a violation is established on the other. In Arlington
Heights, for example, the plaintiffs sought an injunction preventing
the village from interfering with the construction of the MHDC
development. Arguably, injunctive relief would be inappropriate
had both racial discrimination and legitimate zoning considerations
motivated the trustees' action. Otherwise, a finding of racial purpose would require the village to accept the development no matter
how inappropriate it might be from a zoning standpoint-even if the
development, for example, were eighty stories high and located in
the middle of an area of $100,000 houses. Absent the problem of
appropriate relief, however, it is clear, at least in theory, that the
rejection of even this proposal on the basis of race should be held
unconstitutional. 3 5 The appropriate relief in these circumstances
would not be an order requiring the construction of the project, but
invalidation of the decision and a "remand to the legislature" for
reconsideration of the proposal on the basis of purely legitimate
factors.331 Justice Powell is not the first to confuse questions of substantive law with questions of appropriate relief in civil rights
played a non-trivial part in the decisionmaking process, so that it might have affected the
outcome." Id. at 119.
332. 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
333. See notes 91 & 130 supra.
334. Legislative Motive, supra note 78, at 116 n.ll0.
335. It is theoretical only because the case would be impossible to prove if municipal
officials kept silent.
336. The judicial response of remanding to the legislature is a familiar technique in
constitutional law. See generally Gunther, supra note 5, at 43-46.
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cases.137 Moreover, his statement that a showing of discriminatory
purpose would not establish an equal protection violation, but
would merely shift the burden to the defendants was simply dictum,
because the Court held that the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights had
failed to make the required showing of racial purpose in the first
place.ns If the Supreme Court persists in this approach, however, it
should at least place on the government a heavy burden of proving
that the challenged action would have been the same even in the
339
absence of the proven discriminatory purpose.
Justice Powell's comments should not be confused with the
concept of a prima facie case discussed in Davis. The latter is concerned with whether and how the plaintiff proves discriminatory
purpose. If he produces evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of discriminatory purpose-and what is "sufficient" may well
depend on the context involved, as Justice Stevens indicated in
Davis-the burden of proof on the issue of purpose shifts to the
government.3 41 The concept of the prima facie case of discriminatory
purpose, however, is distinct from Justice Powell's additional proposition in Arlington Heights, that after discriminatorypurpose has
been established, the government may still prevail by proving that
the same action would have resulted in the absence of the discriminatory purpose.
In addition to Justice Powell's conclusion that racial purpose
need not be the sole or dominant basis for the challenged state
action, his statement of the legal standard in Arlington Heights
differs from Davis by focusing on motivation. In contrast to Justice
White's opinion in Davis, which carefully articulated the standard
only in terms of "purpose," the Arlington Heights opinion not only
used "purpose" and "intent" interchangeably,3 4' but also indicated
that the crucial question is whether the discriminatory intent or
purpose was "a motivating factor" in the decision under review. 42
This choice of words, coupled with Justice Powell's observation that
337. See text accompanying notes 138-42 supra.
338. 429 U.S. at 270 & n.21.
339. See Legislative Motive, supra note 78, at 117-18, 126.
340. What the government's burden is at this point is not entirely clear. It may be a
burden of producing evidence, i.e., it will lose if it stands silent, or it may be a burden of
persuasion, i.e., it may lose if it stands silent, see text accompanying notes 434-48 infra,
and this in turn may depend in part on whether the discriminatory purpose issue is considered
a question of law or a question of fact, another subject considered by the insightful concurring
opinion of Justice Stevens in Davis. See 426 U.S. at 253. Indeed, this whole matter was to
prove a source of great confusion and division among the justices two months later in Castaneda v. Partida, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
341. 429 U.S. at 265.
342, Id. at 265-66, 270.
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legislators and administrators take many considerations into account in reaching their decisions,343 suggests that a court may appropriately examine the subjective motives of official decisionmakers
as well as the objective consequences of their actions.3 1 Indeed, the
opinion indicates that the court may consider all direct and circum3 45
stantial evidence of intent that is available.
The Court's opinion in Arlington Heights also went beyond the
Davis standard by listing three broad "subjects for proper inquiry"
relevant to determining whether discriminatory purpose was one of
the motivating factors in the challenged decision.3 4 1 Justice Powell
observed, as had Justice White in Davis, that racial impact might
be an important starting point.3 4 7 He noted that the disproportionate racial impact in Yick Wo and Gomillion had been extreme,
however, and concluded that a statistical pattern of discriminatory
impact would rarely be determinative, except perhaps in the jury
discrimination cases, in which the selection process should be completely random.3 48 In most other situations, Justice Powell argued,
the historical background and legislative history of the state action
would require review. The historical background included such
questions as whether a series of prior actions apparently resulted
from racial purposes and whether the sequence of events leading up
to the challenged action was suspicious, because, for example, it
departed from the normal procedures followed or substantive factors
considered in taking similar official action. Furthermore, Justice
Powell indicated that a court could consider contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meet343. Id. at 265.
344. The Court, however, suggested one limitation on the judicial examination of the
lawmakers' motivation. Noting that an inquiry into motives represents "a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government," Justice Powell concluded that
"[pilacing a decisionmaker on the stand is therefore 'usually to be avoided.' " 429 U.S. at
268 n.18 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)). This
view seems unduly restrictive and not a little naive. The responsible officials are likely to
appear voluntarily to testify about the "legitimate" purposes for their action, at least when
a decision of a local governmental body is involved, and such appearances should constitute
waivers of whatever "privilege" of silence they may have had. And if government officials are
likely to testify, plaintiffs should have an opportunity before trial to discover not only the
substance of their testimony, but also any information that appears reasonably related to the
subject matter of that testimony. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). But see 429 U.S. at 270 n.20;
note 290 supra.
345. 429 U.S. at 266.
346. Id. at 266-68.
347. Id. at 266. Arlington Heights, like Davis, did not distinguish between discrimina.
tory "effect" and discriminatory "impact." See note 192 supra.
348. 429 U.S. at 266 n.13. This approach reinforces the suggestion of Justice Stevens
in Davis that the proof necessary to establish discriminatory purpose may well vary in different contexts. 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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ing, and its reports to determine the legislative or administrative
history of the challenged action, and "in some extraordinary instances," the members themselves might be called to the stand, although their testimony "frequently will be barred by privilege." 49
Justice Powell stated that this list of evidentiary sources was not
exhaustive, and the list's subjects of inquiry are not at all surprising
in light of the Court's prior equal protection decisions.310 The discussion of the relevance of historical background, for example, included
citations to Griffin, Keyes, and Reitman. Nevertheless, because the
Court undertook to develop this list and because seven of the eight
justices who participated in the case joined this part of the opinion,
the list is likely to be an important guide in future cases.
3.

The Legal Standard Applied

More revealing than Justice Powell's list of potentially relevant
subjects was his use of the evidence in Arlington Heights to conclude
that the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proof. Indeed,
considering the posture of the case when it reached the Supreme
Court, the very fact that he conducted a thorough review of the
evidence at all is significant. Both the trial court and appellate
decisions in Arlington Heights preceded Washington v. Davis, and
both focused on discriminatory effect, although, as Justice Powell
noted, the district court also found that hostility to minority groups
had not motivated the defendants' decision, and the court of appeals did not overturn this finding as clearly erroneous. 5 ' In these
circumstances, the Supreme Court might simply have vacated the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the new legal standard enunciated in
Davis.3 51 If, on the other hand, the Court considered the district
court's determination about the trustees' motivation to be, fortuitously, the very finding of fact that was dispositive under the Davis
standard, then the Court could have reversed the appellate decision
simply because the district court's finding was not clearly erro35 3
neous.
The Supreme Court chose neither of these alternatives. Rather,
it determined that discriminatory purpose had not been a motivating factor in the village's decision based on an independent review
349. 429 U.S. at 268.
350. See text accompanying notes 269-70 supra.
351. 429 U.S. at 268-69.
352. See id. at 272 (White, J., dissenting).
353. See id. at 273 (White, J., dissenting). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969); United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948).
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of the evidence. This independent review by the Court demonstrates
two important points. First, although Justice Powell's opinion implied that some weight should be accorded to the trial court's finding on the discriminatory purpose issue, the review undertaken by
the Court in Arlington Heights indicates that the Supreme Court
has not yet decided whether this issue of purpose is to be treated
on appeal as a question of fact or a question of law, or, indeed,
whether the characterization of the issue might not vary depending
on the context involved.3 54 Second, the Court apparently will not
refrain from deciding equal protection cases that were tried in the
era before Washington v. Davis, even though evidence of discriminatory purpose may be understandably sparse in the records. In
Arlington Heights, Justice Powell dismissed the plaintiffs' contention that they had been foreclosed from asking the trustees why they
voted against the MHDC proposal. He maintained that the district
court's action was not improper "[i]n light of respondents' repeated insistence that it was effect and not motivation which would
make out a constitutional violation. 3155 The Court's suggestion that
the plaintiffs waived the issue of discriminatory purpose is patently
unfair. The complaint did allege that the village's decision had both
a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory effect. The trial
court, not the plaintiffs, decided that inquiry into the trustees' motivation was impermissible under Palmer v. Thompson, by ruling
that the case was governed by an effect standard only. The defendants, not the plaintiffs, sought this ruling on the irrelevance of
the trustees' purpose.3 5 These circumstances hardly suggest that
the plaintiffs waived their right to present direct evidence of racial
purpose in Arlington Heights. In other actions tried before Davis
much, now relevant, evidence relating to discriminatory purpose
will not have been presented to or considered by the lower courts.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's action in Arlington Heights suggests that the Court will continue to review these cases on the merits, despite inadequate records and resulting prejudice to plaintiffs. 3 57
Justice Powell began his review of the Arlington Heights record
by considering whether the impact of the village's decision would
bear more heavily on racial minorities than on whites. He apparently concluded that the showing that minorities made up forty
354.
355.
356.
357.

See
429
See
See

also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
U.S. at 270 n.20.
text accompanying note 290 supra.
429 U.S. at 271-72 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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percent of the income groups eligible for the MHDC development,
but only eighteen percent of the overall Chicago area population
established discriminatory impact. This conclusion is rather surprising if the Court considers "discriminatory impact" an indicator
of illicit racial purpose. As the court of appeals had recognized,
these statistics had no independent significance concerning the racial nature of this municipal decision, beyond the fact that blacks
are disproportionately represented among low- and moderateincome groups in the Chicago area. This fact, while deplorable,
would be true even if the defendant were a small, poor, totally
integrated village instead of Arlington Heights. Moreover, reliance
on this type of statistical comparison proves too much as well as too
little, because it would favor housing proposals designed to resegregate the area rather than integrate it. According to Justice Powell's
analysis, the racial impact of the village's decision would be substantially greater-and thus more suggestive of an impermissible
purpose-if MHDC had proposed a totally black-occupied project
instead of the integrated development it actually proposed. 358 A statistical comparison of the racial mix of the overall population with
the racial mix of the group affected by the challenged decision obviously can be relevant in racial discrimination cases, particularly
when the claim is that the state has excluded minorities from a jury
35 9
panel or a job opportunity or some other desired right or benefit.
Nevertheless, official action need not be exclusionary to violate the
equal protection clause. As the school desegregation cases demonstrate, governmental decisions that intentionally perpetuate segregation and prevent interracial association may also be unconstitutional. When this is the essence of a plaintiff's claim, as it was in
Arlington Heights, the statistical comparison used by Justice Powell
may not be very significant in analyzing the discriminatory impact
of the decision under review. 30
Although the Arlington Heights opinion was overly concerned
with the fact that minorities are disproportionately represented
358. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1018 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd,
564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977) (minorities make up 95% of waiting list for proposed public
housing project). See generally Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
359. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977). See
generally Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 128, 166-67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Title VIII Litigation].
360. See Stingley v. City of Lincoln Park, 429 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1977). In
evaluating proof of discriminatory effect, "[jiudges should consider why statistical evidence
is valuable given the rationales for the prima facie case and should weigh the particular
strength or weaknesses of statistical and other evidence according to the historical and evidentiary circumstances in each case." Title VIII Litigation, supra note 359, at 167.
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among poorer income groups, it totally ignored the massive residential segregation in the village and the other facts about the racial
impact of the trustees' decision that were unique to Arlington
Heights. The Court did not mention the tremendous growth that the
village had experienced in recent years, much less the fact that
blacks accounted for less than one tenth of one percent of these new
residents when the black population of the Chicago metropolitan
area was growing to eighteen percent. The opinion recognized neither the expert testimony in the record demonstrating that Arlington Heights was the most segregated large municipality in the entire
metropolitan area nor the fact that this segregation was almost
certainly caused by racial discrimination.36 ' No mention was made
of the tremendous movement of jobs from Chicago to the Arlington
Heights suburban area with the resulting need for local low- and
moderate-income housing or of the village's denial of all proposals
for subsidized housing developments while approving some sixty
3 2
rezoning petitions for over 5,200 market-rent apartments.
Thus, the Court neglected to consider a large portion of the
"historical background" of the village's refusal to rezone the site of
the proposed MHDC development. Whereas the Seventh Circuit
had suggested that this background created an affirmative duty on
33
the part of the village not to interfere with the MHDC proposal,
the Supreme Court apparently considered this history completely
irrelevant. Certainly in Arlington Heights, even though no direct
evidence of the trustees' motivations had been introduced, "the
totality of relevant facts" that Washington v. Davis said should be
examined for discriminatory purpose indicated a much more indifferent, if not actually hostile, official attitude toward minorities
than in Davis. The real question, however, was whether the village's
segregated growth pattern was "relevant" in evaluating the trustees'
denial of the MHDC rezoning petition, and Arlington Heights implied that it was not. For all that appears in Justice Powell's opin361. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,
413-14 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975). The number of blacks in Arlington Heights in 1970 would have
been over 3,200, not 27, if the housing market there had been governed only by economic
factors and random choice. See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 50 (50 WR-9) (copy on file at the office of
the University of Illinois Law Forum); Reply Brief, supra note 319, at 5 n.*.
362. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,
412, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1975); Brief for Respondents at 11, Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Respondents'
Brief] (copy of file at the office of the University of Illinois Law Forum).
363. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 415
(7th Cir. 1975). This duty not to interfere, however, does not necessarily suggest an affirmative duty of the village to provide low-income housing itself. See Acevedo v. Nassau County.
500 F.2d 1078, 1081 (2d Cir. 1974); Title VIII Litigation, supra note 359, at 170.
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ion, the racial impact of the village's decision would have been
exactly the same if Arlington Heights had been a small suburb with
thousands of minority residents and scores of subsidized housing
developments.
The historical background that the Court did consider relevant
was the sequence of events immediately preceding the trustees' decision to deny the rezoning petition. 64 Here, the Court found little
to "spark suspicion." Justice Powell noted that the rezoning request
generally progressed according to the usual procedures and suggested that the village plan commission had actually gone out of its
way to accommondate MHDC by scheduling three hearings instead
of one. These conclusions are misleading. The record clearly established that Arlington Heights did not respond to the MHDC proposal as just another rezoning request. Racially explicit letters appeared in the local newspaper," 5 and thousands of residents signed
petitions opposing the development. The plan commission held its
additional hearings in a high school auditorium to hold the demonstrative overflow crowds, not so much to consider the merits of the
MHDC proposal as to accommodate the unprecedented number of
homeowners and "civic" group spokesmen who wanted to register
their opposition to the development.
The fact that many local residents opposed the development for
racial reasons does not necessarily mean that the trustees denied the
rezoning petition for the same reasons. Conceivably, an official
could ignore expressions of racial bias by his constituents and still
reach the decision those constituents desired, and courts should not
lightly assume otherwise. When the evidence of community racial
hostility is strong, however, a rebuttable presumption that this hostility affected the official decision is appropriate, " particularly
364. 429 U.S. at 269-70.
365. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 48-1, 48-2, 48-3, 48-7, 48-9 (copy on file at the office of the
University of Illinois Law Forum).
One letter from a local resident appearing in the Arlington Heights Herald a
month before the first Plan Commission hearing began:
"Concerning your editorial, 'Housing: An Ignored Issue': It isn't ignored, it's
unwanted. We do resist low-income housing because it is a ploy to export blacks
from Chicago to integrate the suburbs. That came out forcefully in the St. Viator
Housing proposal."
Another letter complained:
"I'm a bit tired of hearing and reading about the Low Income Housing in
Arlington Heights for the benefit of our colored and Spanish-American friends
in Chicago. One wonders who is running our village, our [Village President]
Walsh or Mayor Daley."
Respondents' Brief, supra note 362, at 17-18.
366. Lower courts considering claims similar to the plaintiffs' in Arlington Heights have
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when one of the decisionmakers states, as the Arlington Heights
village president did, that "the objections of the residents is [sic]
3 7 Hence, Justice Powell's cona mandate to reject this proposal.""
clusion that the procedural history of the MHDC zoning hearings
was not suspicious is simply not consistent with the record in
Arlington Heights. After Davis, the plaintiff in an equal protection
case is essentially required to prove a negative-that the challenged
decision was not based on any reason other than racial discrimination-and this is difficult enough without the Court ignoring evidence of an official decisionmaker's awareness of the racial hostility
of his constituents.
Another reason why Justice Powell found that the historical
background of the village's decision was unsuspicious was that the
site selected for the MHDC development had always been zoned for
single-family purposes. He noted that "we would have a far different
case" if the land had originally been zoned for apartments and the
town had changed the zoning classification to single-family after
learning of MHDC's plans to build integrated housing. 68 This is
true, but not nearly as significant as the Court's opinion suggested.
A town may choose to zone its residential land in either of two ways.
It may determine in advance where certain uses are permitted, or
it may, like Arlington Heights, apply a single-family classification
to all vacant land as a holding device and grant specific rezoning
petitions for particular multiple-family developments. 69 In the
former situation, if a developer like MHDC chose a site already
zoned for apartments, a municipality bent on preventing the development would have to change its prior determination immediately
and rezone the land to single-family uses. Such a change would
indeed indicate that nonzoning considerations were at work. A zoning scheme like that of Arlington Heights, however, could be used
intentionally to discriminate against an integrated housing development in a similar, albeit less obvious way. The town could simply
wait until the developer had submitted a proposal, which might well
be comparable to previously accepted commercial developments in
recognized the probative value of evidence of white hostility in establishing that official action
excluding subsidized housing was racially motivated. See, e.g., Park View Heights Corp. v.
City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1210 (8th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City
of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey
v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425
F. Supp. 987 (E.D.Pa. 1976), aff'd, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
367. Respondents' Brief, supra note 362, at 19.
368. 429 U.S. at 267.
369. See Reply Brief, supra note 319, at 16 n.*
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its impact on the surrounding neighborhood, and then reject it in
an apparently "neutral" action that merely maintains the status
quo.37 ° There is evidence to suggest that Arlington Heights did exactly that. Prior to the MHDC decision, the village had approved
some sixty petitions for zoning changes from single-family to
multiple-family in its "comprehensive plan," including proposals
for apartment developments next to every high school in town except St. Viator's and for dozens of others next to existing singlefamily neighborhoods. 7 '
Thus, although finding discriminatory purpose in a municipality's refusal to rezone may be difficult, it should be possible if a
court examines not only the specific decision challenged, but also
the town's disposition of similar petitions to rezone. If a town has
no zoning history or evidence is not available or not persuasive for
some other reason, a plaintiff may be unable to meet his burden of
proving discriminatory purpose, but what is perplexing about
Arlington Heights is that the evidence existed, but the Court hardly
considered it. Rather, Justice Powell limited his examination of the
"historical background" in Arlington Heights to the sequence of
events set in motion by the MHDC petition and did not include any
reference to the village's other rezoning decisions. The contrast between the perspective of the historical background taken in
Arlington Heights and Justice White's broader approach in Davis
is striking. Justice White considered not only the police department's use of Test 21, but also the overall results of its entire recruiting program. The perspective chosen by the Court was crucial in
both cases, and in both cases, it favored the defendants.
Justice Powell's "shorter" perspective may be a necessary corollary of his interpretation that discriminatory purpose must be "a
motivating factor" of official action. If the question is whether racial
considerations actually motivated the six individual trustees who
voted against the MHDC petition, then other zoning decisions made
by other trustees going back to 1959 could hardly be relevant. The
problem of which time frame to use in evaluating the government's
purposes is another important issue left unresolved by Davis. In
courts should not
370. In seeking to identify unconstitutional motivation .
consider themselves bound by any rigid action-inaction distinction. A racially motivated decision not to alter attendance zone lines should trigger a judicial demand for
an explanation as readily as a racially motivated decision to redraw them, though the
proof problems are likely to be more substantial.
Ely, supra note 77, at 1292.
371. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,
412 (7th Cir. 1975); Respondents' Brief, supra note 362, at 11 n.**.
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some cases, the Supreme Court has said that the original purpose
at the time of the enactment of a law controls, but other precedents
in other contexts indicate that a law's purpose can change over time
and that the case should turn on what the "modern" purpose is.372
Neither Davis nor Arlington Heights explicitly dealt with this question, but Justice Powell's opinion implied that the answer in equal
protection cases will depend on whether discriminatory purpose is
perceived as an objective matter of the operation of the challenged
state action or a subjective matter of the state of mind of the individual lawmakers. Because the Court defined the ultimate issue in
Arlington Heights as whether race was "a motivating factor" in the
trustees' decision to reject the MHDC proposal, it focused on the
trustees' purposes at the time of that decision, not on the purposes
reflected in the overall history of the village's land use policies.
The Court's emphasis on motivation may increase the difficulties of proving equal protection violations in another way. Justice
Stevens had indicated in Davis that he would presume that an
official intended the natural consequences of his actions. 7 3 This
presumption would hold government officials responsible for what
they do or at least make them explain why holding them responsible
in a given case would be unfair. Thus, after a showing of discriminatory effect, the burden on the discriminatory purpose issue would
shift to the government, even though the responsible official may
not have intended or even considered the racial consequences of his
action.3 7' If, as Arlington Heights implies, the proper focus is not the
government action, but rather the actual state of mind of the officials taking that action, then Justice Stevens's presumption seems
inappropriate. Indeed, the Court in Arlington Heights treated the
fact that the village's decision had a discriminatory effect as
"without independent constitutional significance ' 37 5 and held that
the plaintiffs had failed to make even a threshold showing of discriminatory purpose. Thus, although the Arlington Heights standard that racial purpose must be "a motivating factor" may help
equal protection plaintiffs because they need not establish that race
was the sole or dominant factor, the standard could also work
against them by requiring proof that the defendants were actually
motivated by racial animus.
372. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
373. 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
374. See Legislative Motive, supra note 78, at 105 & n.59.
375. 429 U.S. at 271.
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Justice Powell's review of the Arlington Heights record concluded with the "legislative history" of the village's decision.37 He
noted that the minutes of the plan commission and board of trustees
meetings indicated that their members focused almost exclusively
on the zoning questions raised by the MHDC petition. This is hardly
surprising. Even if the officials had decided to discriminate, it is
unlikely that they would have announced their true intentions publicly. Indeed, they may well have sought to build a record of
"innocent" statements.3 77 As the Tenth Circuit has observed: "If
proof of a civil rights violation depends on an open statement by an
official of an intent to discriminate, the Fourteenth Amendment
37
offers little solace to those seeking its protection.""
To contend in this day and age that the absence of bigoted
comments in official minutes and reports tends to prove that the
responsible officials are not racially motivated is unreasonable. Justice Powell's reliance on the minutes of the meetings may be more
sophisticated, however, because he also noted that the zoning considerations referred to in the minutes of the MHDC hearings were
the very ones that the village relied on at trial. Thus, his point may
be that regardless of the absence of racial remarks, if the government "changes its story" about which legitimate purpose its action
allegedly serves between the time it takes that action and the time
it defends it in court, an inference of racial purpose could arise. As
Professor Gunther suggested in a different context, the Court might
assess the challenged action "in terms of the state'spurposes, rather
than hypothesizing conceivable justifications of its own initia379
tive."
Justice Powell's concern with the village's zoning considerations in his review of the proof of racial discrimination is consistent
with the approach taken in Davis. In Davis the court considered the
role of Test 21 in the police department's efforts to upgrade the
quality of its personnel before concluding that the plaintiffs failed
to establish a discriminatory purpose. Clearly, the Court intends to
use its new racial purpose requirement to review the legitimacy of
the government's claimed interests at the initial stage of its equal
protection analysis rather than waiting until after deciding the discrimination issue, when the result of this examination of the state's
interests is always a predictable and therefore inconsequential final
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id. at 270.
See note 276 supra.
Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970).
Gunther, supra note 5, at 46.
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step. The opinions in Davis and Arlington Heights suggest that if
the challenged state action advances any legitimate governmental
interest, the Court will uphold it as not involving a racial purpose.
Essentially, the plaintiff must prove that the claimed justifications
for the law neither prompted its passage nor are served by its enactment. This proof will be difficult in all contexts, but in matters such
as zoning, in which the courts accord substantial deference to the
judgment of local government officials, it may be impossible.
Arlington Heights continued the Supreme Court's tradition of
extreme deference to municipal zoning decisions. Justice Powell's
opinion accepted both the village's concern for neighboring property
values and its claim that the MHDC proposal was inconsistent with
its buffer policy. He concluded that "[tihere is no reason to doubt"
that some local homeowners had relied on the maintenance of
single-family zoning in the area.8 0 Actually, this claim was subject
to considerable doubt. First, the builders of the neighboring houses
could not have relied on the comprehensive zoning plan, because
their houses were built years before the plan was adopted.3 8' Even
if the homes had been sold to new owners after the adoption of the
plan, the new residents certainly could not expect all of the Viatorian land to remain vacant indefinitely. They should have known
that when it was developed it could be used for apartments, because
Arlington Heights had permitted multiple-family developments
next to every other high school in the village.3 82 In fact, the Court
should not have treated the reliance claim as a separate defense at
all. The claim is meaningless apart from a consideration of the
zoning aspects of the MHDC proposal, because only reasonablereliance deserves judicial protection and what is reasonable depends on
how the village's legitimate zoning policies applied to the MHDC
site. Local homeowners, for example, could not have a reasonable
reliance interest in enforcing a zoning scheme against MHDC that
specifically provided that only whites live on the Viatorian property 383
With respect to the zoning considerations, Justice Powell held
that the village had applied its buffer zone policy "too consistently
for us to infer discriminatory purpose from its application in this
case." 384 The evidence on this issue indicated that this policy had
380. 429 U.S. at 270.
381. See Respondents' Brief, supra note 362, at 34 n.*.
382. Id. at 11 n.**.
383. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 415
(7th Cir. 1975); see Buchanon v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
384. 429 U.S. at 270.
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apparently led to the denial of some rezoning petitions although the
village had also ignored the buffer policy and approved a number
of other developments next to single-family neighborhoods. 3 " In
other words, the plaintiffs established no clear pattern of the Yick
Wo or Gomillion variety, and under these circumstances, the Court
was unwilling to reject the village's zoning justification and infer
discriminatory purpose. The Court's conclusion is both important
and revealing. When the application of a policy has been inconsistent and arbitrary, the policy provides the opportunity to discriminate against minorities, at least when the opportunity for discrimination is present because the officials know the race of the applicants. In Arlington Heights, however, this very inconsistency led
Justice Powell to uphold the challenged action. Although the Court
may not be so deferential when examining other kinds of official
action, Arlington Heights provides municipal officials with almost
unlimited discretion to make exclusionary zoning decisions. 6 The
Court did not hold that the trustees' rejection of the MHDC proposal was "correct" in light of the applicable zoning criteria; the
Court merely determined that the rejection was not so clearly wrong
as to suggest that the trustees failed to consider any zoning criteria
at all. Thus, in order to establish the necessary racial purpose in a
case like Arlington Heights by showing the absence of any legitimate government purpose, the plaintiff may have to prove that the
challenged decision would not even satisfy the rational basis test of
traditional equal protection analysis; that is, establishing discriminatory purpose may only be possible when it is not necessary.
In summary, Arlington Heights showed that the Supreme
Court was unanimous in its determination to apply Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement to all types of racial discrimination
claims under the equal protection clause, but it also showed that the
articulation and application of that requirement could still divide
the Court. Justice Powell stated that determining the existence of
discriminatory purpose in a particular case demanded "a sensitive
inquiry" into all of the evidence available, but only four other members of the Court joined his "inquiry" which often was neither sensitive nor convincing. His use of the lower court findings was uncertain; his analysis of the racial impact of the trustees' decision was
shallow; his examination of the community's response to the MHDC
385. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,
412 (7th Cir. 1975).
386. But see cases cited at 429 U.S. at 267 nn.16-17; Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo,
425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
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proposal and the village's zoning history was almost nonexistent;
and his review of the defendant's justifications for their action was
so deferential that it was meaningless. Nevertheless, the Court did
leave open the possibility that a municipal zoning decision could
violate the equal protection clause in a more egregious case, and, by
remanding Arlington Heights for consideration of the statutory
claim, it also suggested that the Fair Housing Act might prohibit a
3 7
zoning decision with a discriminatory effect. 1
Arlington Heights demonstrated much more vividly than Davis
just how difficult it will be to prove purposeful discrimination, particularly if the challenge is to essentially passive or indifferent state
action that perpetuates de facto segregation and if that action involves the exercise of substantial governmental discretion. Perhaps
the only way to prove such a case would be to show that the responsible officials personally intended to discriminate.3 88 The Court indicated that this type of subjective evidence is relevant, although
judicial inquiry into subjective intent may generally prove more
helpful to government defendants than to minority claimants. Indeed, the question of whether to focus on the objective consequences
or the subjective motives of the challenged state action was once
again before the Court two months later when it again considered
the discriminatory purpose requirement in Castaneda v. Partida
. 38
C.
1.

Castaneda v. Partida

Background

Castanedawas a jury discrimination case. In March 1972, Rodrigo Partida was indicted for burglary by the grand jury of the district court of Hidalgo County, Texas. 30 After his trial and conviction, he moved for a new trial on the ground that the county's grand
jury selection process discriminated against Mexican-Americans.
The evidence submitted by Partida in support of his motion consisted almost entirely of census data and Hidalgo County grand
jury records. 38 ' The statistics showed that Mexican-Americans
were often summoned as grand jurors, but at a substantially lower
rate than other residents in the county. Although 79.1% of the
county's population was made up of Spanish-language and Spanish
387. See note 324 supra.
388. See 1970 Term, supra note 129, at 95.
389. 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
390. Id. at 1275.
391. Partida also testified about the general existence of discrimination against
Mexican-Americans in this area of Texas. Id.
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-surnamed persons, the percentage of Spanish-surnamed grand
jurors in Hidalgo County during the previous decade had ranged
from 29.7% to 52.5%, with an average figure of 39.0%.392 Additionally, the census figures indicated that Mexican-Americans in this
south Texas area tended to have low incomes, poor jobs, substandard housing, and low levels of education. The state offered no evidence of its own. The record did reveal, however, that three of the
five jury commissioners were Mexican-Americans and that ten of
the twenty grand jurors summoned in Partida's case and five of the
twelve who returned his indictment, including the foreman, had
Spanish surnames. The trial judge, who was also a MexicanAmerican and who had appointed the jury commissioners, denied
the defendant's motion for a new trial.
After exhausting his state remedies, Partida filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, arguing that the underrepresentation
of Mexican-Americans on the Hidalgo County grand juries violated
the fourteenth amendment. The district court held a hearing at
which the state transcript was introduced. None of the jury commissioners appeared, but the state trial judge did testify about his
selection of the commissioners and the instructions he gave them.
He also described the Texas grand jury selection process, in which
the jury commissioners, who are appointed by the trial judge, first
select fifteen to twenty citizens as potential jurors. The trial judge
then interrogates the candidates under oath to determine whether
they meet the various qualifications for grand jurors spelled out in
the Texas statute33 and selects a grand jury of twelve.
The district court ruled for the state.39 In a lengthy opinion,
Judge Garza found that the statistics produced by Partida, although not entirely reliable, did make out a "bare prima facie case"
of invidious discrimination. 35 The judge, however, believed that the
fact that Mexican-Americans constituted a "governing majority" in
the county rebutted the prima facie showing. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the "governing majority" theory alone did not
rebut Partida's prima facie case.9 8 One week after deciding
392. The Court treated "Spanish-surnamed" and "Mexican-American" as synonyms
for the census designation "Persons of Spanish Language or Spanish Surname," id. at 1276
n.5.
393. Id. at 1275. The statute requires that a grand juror must be a citizen of Texas and
of the county, be a qualified voter in the county, be of sound mind and good moral character,
be literate, have no prior felony convictions, and be under no pending felony indictments.

Id.
394.
395.
396.

Partida v. Castaneda, 384 F. Supp. 79 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
Id. at 90.
Partida v. Castaneda, 524 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Castaneda to consider whether Texas had met its burden of rebutting a prima facie case of jury discrimination.
The Supreme Court held that Texas had not." 7 In a five-to-four
decision, the Court decided that the substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the Hidalgo County grand juries coupled with the highly subjective selection procedure in which
Spanish-surnamed people could be readily identified established a
prima facie case of discrimination. Justice Blackmun's opinion analyzed the statistical evidence offered by Partida and concluded that
the selection procedure was not racially neutral with respect to
Mexican-Americans. Of the 870 persons summoned as potential
grand jurors in the eleven-year period preceding Partida's indictment, 339, or thirty-nine percent, were Mexican-Americans. The
Court noted that in a county where Mexican-Americans accounted
for seventy-nine percent of the overall population the expected
number of Mexican-Americans called for jury duty would be about
688 and the likelihood was less than 1 in 10140 that a random
procedure would select as few as 339 .31 The state had suggested that
using the county's total population figures was misleading, because
they included a substantial number of people who were illiterate,
too young, or for some other reason ineligible to serve as jurors. 3 1,
Justice Blackmun responded that under the Texas system of selecting grand jurors, qualifications were to be tested by the trial judge,
not by the jury commissioners, whose only responsibility was to
produce a certain number of prospective jurors from throughout the
county. 00 Moreover, even if the jury commissioners had considered
qualifications, Mexican-Americans would still account for sixty-five
percent of the people who were eligible to serve, and the likelihood
that only thirty-nine percent would be chosen by chance was still
less than 1 in 1050.401 Finally, an analysis of the data for the twoand-one-half-year period during which the current state trial judge
had supervised the selection process showed that only 100 of the
220 persons called were Mexican-Americans. The Court regarded
the likelihood of these figures resulting from a random selection
method-less than 1 in 10-as negligible. 02 Because the Texas
system provided ample opportunity for discrimination against
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Castaneda v. Partida, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
Id. at 1281 n.17.
See id. at 1276 nn.6 & 8; id. at 1285-86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1276 n.8, 1282.
Id. at 1276 n.8.
Id. at 1281 n.17.
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Mexican-Americans, Castaneda held these statistics sufficient to
shift the burden of proof to the state to dispel the inference of
intentional discrimination. The Court then determined that neither
the testimony of the state trial judge nor the "governing majority"
theory could explain the statistical disparities established, because
"discriminatory intent can be rebutted only with evidence in the
record about the way in which the commissioners operated and their
' 3
'
reasons for doing so.

10

The dissenters produced three separate opinions," 4 each attacking a different aspect of the Court's judgment. Chief Justice Burger
argued that the census data produced by Partida were so unreliable
that they could not establish a prima facie case. Justice Powell
found the claim of intentional discrimination inherently improbable
in a county where Mexican-Americans constituted a governing majority. He believed that "[t]he most significant fact in this case"
was that three of the five jury commissioners were MexicanAmericans, 0° and he agreed with the federal district judge that
"[i]f people in charge can choose whom they want, it is unlikely
they will discriminate against themselves. 408 Both the Chief Justice
and Justice Powell also argued that the statistical disparities in
Castanedawere much less significant than they were in earlier cases
in which the Court had sustained racial discrimination claims, because the previous cases invariably involved the total or almost total
exclusion of minorities from participation on juries.0 7 Justice
Rehnquist joined both of these opinions, and Justice Stewart indicated substantial agreement with them in a separate dissent that
argued for reversal of the court of appeals' judgment on the ground
that the district court's findings were not "clearly erroneous." 408
The tone of the Castanedadissenting opinions is almost one of
betrayal. These four justices had been in the seven-to-two majority
in Davis that initially established the discriminatory purpose requirement. The loss of Justice White and Justice Stevens still left
them with a five-man majority in Arlington Heights and with the
knowledge that all nine justices, including Justices Marshall and
403.

Id. at 1283.

404. Id. at 1285-86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1286-87 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
id., at 1287-92 (Powell, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Marshall, who joined the Court's
opinion, filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1283-85.
405. Id. at 1291 (Powell, J., dissenting).
406. Id. (quoting the district court, 384 F. Supp. at 90).
407. Id. at 1285-86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1289-90 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting);
see note 81 supra.

408.

97 S. Ct. at 1286 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Brennan, agreed with the discriminatory purpose requirement in
theory. In neither earlier case had any justice found that the requirement was satisfied. All that changed in Castaneda. Justice Blackmun left the coalition that had held the balance of power in Davis
and Arlington Heights to lead a new majority in Castaneda, which
held that the discriminatory purpose necessary for an equal protection violation had been shown.
2.

The Legal Standard

To give the dissenters their due, the result does seem strange.
It is hard to believe that the Hidalgo County jury commissioners
actually intended to discriminate against Mexican-Americans. It
seems much more likely, for example, that racial animus motivated
the trustees in Arlington Heights when they voted to block the
MHDC housing development. The Court's response in Castaneda
was that the discriminatory purpose issue must be decided by reviewing the specific facts established in each case, not by speculating about the possible racial attitudes of Mexican-Americans or
other ethnic groups. 0 In Castaneda,the state produced no evidence
about how the commissioners went about selecting prospective jurors, an omission that Justice Blackmun considered both inexplicable and dispositive. The statistical disparities might be explained,
he stated, but Texas had simply not done so. The state was held to
have violated the equal protection clause, simply because of its
failure to respond to Partida's prima facie showing of purposeful
discrimination.
The Court's attitude illustrates that discriminatory purpose is
to be judged on a case-by-case basis. As Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Keyes had noted, a purpose test means that the court can
uphold an action in one case and invalidate essentially the same
action in the next. " ' Castaneda explicitly recognizes this and, indeed, goes one step farther by indicating that the same condition
and the same purpose may lead to different results, because of differences in the proof offered. In the future, government attorneys
faced with jury discrimination claims probably will call the jury
commissioners to testify about their selection procedures,4 ', which,
409. 97 S. Ct. at 1282-83. See also id. at 1283-85 (Marshall, J., concurring).
410. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 233 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
411. See 97 S. Ct. at 1292 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell expressed sympathy
for the state's lawyers in Castaneda, because he felt that they could not have anticipated the
legal standards that the Court applied. Compare his unsympathetic attitude toward a similar
dilemma faced by the Arlington Heights plaintiffs. 429 U.S. at 270 n.20.
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Justice Blackmun implied, would produce a significantly different
record on the discriminatory purpose issue. 12 Hence, Castanedahas
probably sown the seeds of its own destruction. (Ironically, Davis
and Arlington Heights are also "obsolete," because plaintiffs with
similar claims now will bring them under the civil rights laws, which
have been held to prohibit discriminatory effects, " 3 rather than
under the equal protection clause.) Although the particular results
reached by the Supreme Court may thus not be particularly important, the Court's approach in searching for discriminatory purpose
in Davis, Arlington Heights, and Castaneda remains highly significant. Because the Court itself has now recognized that the actual
results produced by a purpose test are of limited precedential value,
litigants and lower courts necessarily will have to consider the discriminatory purpose issue in light of the particular facts available
in each case and use the methodology demonstrated in the Court's
equal protection precedents.
The very fact that the issues in Castaneda deeply divided the
Supreme Court make the decision highly instructive on methodology. The case again raised the question of whether an equal protection claimant must produce proof that racial bias actually motivated the responsible officials. Castaneda apparently answered
"no," at least in the context of jury discrimination cases. The evidence that the Court held to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination was almost entirely statistical. The data demonstrated that the lower proportion of Mexican-American grand jurors
did not result by chance, and the Court noted that the selection
system provided ample opportunity for discrimination. 4 Partida
did testify in general about discrimination against MexicanAmericans in the area, but not about jury selection in particular.
Partida offered no direct evidence about how the individual jury
commissioners operated or about their motives.
Another indication that the objective results of the challenged
system were the Court's primary concern in Castaneda is that the
Court determined to examine the grand jury records for the previous
eleven-year period.4" 5 The actual commissioners who picked the prospective jurors for Partida's case had been in office for less than two412. 97 S. Ct. at 1278, 1282.
413. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII); United States
v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (Title
VIII); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977) (Title VIII).
414. 97 S. Ct. at 1278, 1281.
415. Id. at 1276 & n.7, 1280-81.
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and-one-half years, and the percentage of Mexican-American jurors
had risen recently. Whereas Mexican-Americans accounted for
thirty-nine percent of all the prospective grand jurors called from
1962 to 1972, they made up fifty-two percent of the 1972 array from
which Partida's grand jury was selected. Therefore, as in Arlington
Heights, the time frame by which the Court decided to judge the
state's actions was important in Castaneda, but in contrast to the
Arlington Heights approach, Justice Blackmun chose a longer time
period, which this time worked against the government." 6
Justice Blackmun did not explain why he chose the longer time
frame. The Court apparently considered the eleven-year period because Partida produced data for that period and because the state
did not attack the period selected. The length of the time period
selected for examination, however, is a significant indication of
what evidence the Court considers relevant. The current statistics
were clearly the most probative of the way the 1972 jury commissioners intended to perform in Partida's case, but only the longer
time frame demonstrated the way the overall system had performed
in recent years. Prior jury discrimination cases had focused on the
overall performance of jury selection procedures, and Castaneda's
reliance on these precedents demonstrated the Court's conviction
that neither Davis nor Arlington Heights changed the standards set
by the earlier decisions. The issue that governed Castaneda was
whether the substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans
resulted from purposeful discrimination."7 The issue was not, as
Arlington Heights suggests it should have been, whether purposeful
discrimination was "a motivating factor" in the commissioners' decisionmaking process.
Thus, Castaneda reinforces the notion that what constitutes
proof of discriminatory purpose will vary in different contexts. Specifically, it holds that in order to establish discriminatory purpose
"in the context of grand jury selection, the defendant must show
that the procedure employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or. . .group . . . by comparing the pro416. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, argued that only recent statistics were relevant,
and he complained that the "use of Hidalgo County's practices some 10 years earlier seems
to me entirely indefensible." Id. at 1286. The Court responded that it was up to the state to
show why the 11-year period offered by Partida was unreliable, which the state had failed to
do. Id. at 1281. Justice Blackmun also suggested that the different time frames were not as
significant as they might appear, because even the figures for the last two-and-one-half
years showed that the percentage of Mexican-Americans called was too low to have been
produced by a random selection procedure. Id. at 1281 n.17.
417. 97 S. Ct. at 1279-80.
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portion of the group in the total population to the proportion called
to serve as grand jurors, over a significant time." ' Consequently,
Castaneda's reliance on statistical and other objective evidence
from an eleven-year period reaffirms prior jury discrimination decisions holding that the relevant consideration is the result produced
by the challenged selection procedure "over a significant time."
3.

The Legal Standard Applied

Ironically, the choice of a time period favorable to Partida, and
indeed the holding of Castaneda, demonstrate again how difficult
proof of discriminatory purpose is. Partida prevailed, barely, because he produced statistics showing first, that the selection process
substantially underrepresented Mexican-Americans in a way that a
random procedure would not, and second, that the underrepresentation had persisted for a decade or more. Significantly, Partida
was able to produce evidence showing underrepresentation only because the state kept jury records for previous years. Without these
records, Partida would have been unable to present reliable proof
of how many Mexican-Americans had been included among the
prospective grand jurors and thus would have been unable to show
that the selection process disproportionately excluded minority
members. The Hidalgo County records did not designate the race
or national origin of the person called, but examination of the names
revealed which prospective jurors were Spanish-surnamed, which
the Court was willing to equate with Mexican-Americans.I 9 A black
defendant, however, presumably would be unable to use similar
records to prove that blacks had been substantially underrepresented. Statistical analysis of the kind that helped to establish Partida's claim requires both the availability of relevant data and a
sufficient number of official decisions to provide a statistically significant sample. When this evidence is available, as it often is in
jury discrimination cases, the type of analysis used in Castanedais
possible. In challenges to individual laws or decisions, however, and
in many other equal protection contexts, comparable statistics will
not be available, and the claimant will have to rely on other types
of less persuasive evidence.4 0
418. Id. at 1280 (relying on Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-80 (1954)).
419. See 97 S. Ct. at 1276 n.5.
420. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977); text accompanying notes 364-72 & 384-86.
The determination that a particular decision was illicitly motivated . . . typically
depends on more intuitive and impressionistic inferences. Statistical techniques gener-
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The second element of Partida's statistical proof was that
Mexican-Americans had been substantially underrepresented
among those called for grand jury service for at least eleven years
prior to his indictment. As a matter of precedent, this aspect of
Castanedais also somewhat disturbing, because it suggests that an
equal protection claimant may have to prove that the discriminatory state action that harmed him was part of an overall pattern of
discrimination directed against his race or national origin. Similarly, the Arlington Heights opinion specifically included prior discriminatory acts among its list of "subjects for proper inquiry."42 '
The suggestion was that MHDC might have prevailed if it had
shown that the village had blocked integrated housing developments on other occasions. Justice Powell did recognize that a single
racially motivated decision could be unconstitutional, 2 but the
problem is proving such racial motivation when the discrimination
is not blatant. The practical implication of Arlington Heights and
Castaneda may be that government officials may intentionally discriminate "for a while" before they are in any danger of losing an
equal protection suit.
The absence of a substantial state interest in Castaneda also
distinguished it from Davis and Arlington Heights. Texas certainly
had a legitimate interest in setting reasonable qualifications for its
grand jurors and in producing a sufficient number of jurors to carry
out judicial business, but, as the Court recognized, the commissioners' job was not to test the qualifications of the prospective jurors.2 3
That was the duty of the trial judge. The commissioners' only responsibility was to produce a list of candidates, and if they had used
an unbiased selection procedure, they should have called persons of
all backgrounds on a fairly random basis." 4
Thus, Partida's proof that the underrepresentation of MexicanAmericans did not result from a purely random selection process
was significant only because of the particular circumstances of his
case. As in Davis and Arlington Heights, the Court weighed the
importance of the state interest as part of the initial determination
ally are of less assistance in explaining the basis for a particular decision than in
explaining the basis for a pattern of decisions. It often is not clear what events count
as salient data for the inference, the sample is likely to be small, and the data are likely
to consist of events so lacking in similarity as to preclude systematic analysis.
Legislative Motive, supra note 78, at 114-15 n.104.
421. 429 U.S. at 267-68.
422. Id. at 266 n.14. See also Ely, supra note 77, at 1264 n.173.
423. 97 S. Ct. at 1276 n.8, 1282.
424. Id.
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of whether the plaintiff had made a showing of discrimination, but
in Castaneda the Court did not consider the interest legitimate or
substantial. Similarly, once the Court decided the discrimination
issue, it did not bother with the second stage of traditional equal
protection analysis, in which the state interest is examined as either
rational or compelling. The determination of the discriminatory
purpose issue decided the entire case.
In other contexts, a showing of minority underrepresentation by
itself will not prove discriminatory purpose if the underrepresentation is the product of state action that the Court believes also
serves a legitimate purpose or deserves judicial deference. In
Arlington Heights, for example, expert testimony established that
3,200 blacks would live in the village if no housing discrimination
existed and if residential patterns were based solely on economic
factors and random choice,425 a fact that Justice Powell ignored in
upholding the trustees' discretionary zoning power. In Castaneda,
the Court probably would not have sustained the discrimination
claim if the challenge had been directed against the trial judge's
part of the selection system, in which some discretion in testing the
prospective jurors' qualifications would be acceptable, instead of
against the jury commissioners, whose role was not to judge qualifications.
Justice Powell's dissent in Castaneda argued that "one may
agree that the disproportion did not occur by chance without agree4 , In
ing that it resulted from purposeful invidious discrimination.""
response, Justice Blackmun wondered what the cause could be, if
not either chance or discrimination. The jury commissioners may
have decided to test the qualifications of prospective jurors before
calling them,4 even though this was not among their statutory
responsibilities. If they did engage in some "winnowing out" process, however, the Court held that "it was incumbent on the state
to call the commissioners and to have them explain how this was

done. "428
425. See note 361 supra. Of course, Arlington Heights did not directly limit the number
of blacks living in the village, but its zoning decisions in general and its rejection of the
MHDC petition in particular arguably encouraged the private housing discrimination that
caused these segregated residential patterns. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
426. 97 S. Ct. at 1287.
427. The state trial judge who appointed the commissioners "testified that he had
instructed them about the qualifications for a grand juror and the exemptions provided by
law." 97 S. Ct. at 1278.
428. 97 S. Ct. at 1276 n.8. See also id. at 1278, 1282.
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Castaneda'sapproach shows that the Court will presume that
'
an official "intended the natural consequences of his deeds,"429
at
least in many jury discrimination cases and perhaps in other contexts in which the official does not have substantial discretionary
authority. Moreover, it indicates that the Court has no general
objection to personalized evidence of the jury commissioners' motives or subjective mental processes. Indeed, the entire opinion implies that the state was remiss in failing to produce testimony about
"the motivations and methods of the grand jury commissioners who
43 Thus, although
selected persons for the grand jury lists.""
Castaneda demonstrates that an equal protection claimant can establish purposeful discrimination on the basis of purely objective
evidence, it does not preclude the use of more subjective testimony
nor does it conflict with Justice Powell's admonition in Arlington
Heights that the courts should consider all available evidence of
intent. 3 '
Finally, Justice Blackmun's approach reflects his belief that
motivation testimony is essentially rebuttal evidence, which the
government should have the burden of producing. This burden is
placed on the government basically as a matter of fairness. The jury
commissioners are "the only ones in a position to explain the apparent substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans and to
provide information on the actual operation of the selection process." 43 2 Because the state failed to call the commissioners, any
inference drawn from the absence of their testimony was apparently
drawn against the state, not against Partida. 3 3 Hence, the
Castanedaapproach differs from that of Arlington Heights, because
in the earlier decision, Justice Powell considered the lack of direct
evidence concerning the trustees' racial motives to be a factor supporting his conclusion that the plaintiffs had not met their threshold
burden of proving discriminatory purpose.
429. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
430. 97 S. Ct. at 1282-83.
431. 429 U.S. at 266. But see 97 S. Ct. at 1288-91 (Powell, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the majority had not adequately considered all of the "subjects of proper inquiry" that
Arlington Heights identified as relevant to the discriminatory purpose issue).
432.

97 S. Ct. at 1278.

433. See generally Title VIII Litigation, supra note 359, at 157-58.
Rather than require the plaintiff to discover all possible justifications and demonstrate
that each was not involved or is not legitimate, considerations of fairness, convenience,
and judicial economy suggest that the defendant, with inherently greater access to
information about his own operations and motivations, be required to demonstrate the
reasons for his conduct.
Id. at 157.
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Castaneda, however, did not really draw any inferences for or
against either party as a result of the absence of evidence of the
motives of the jury commissioners. Instead, the Court simply determined that showing how the commissioners actually operated was
not a necessary element of Partida's prima facie case. Nevertheless,
these concepts are related. The consequence of holding that a particular element need not be proved by an equal protection claimant
is that the absence of any evidence on that point will not defeat his
claim. Similarly, the absence of evidence will not make the evidence
that he has produced in support of his claim any less persuasive, as
long as the government is in a better position than the claimant to
produce evidence concerning its own officials' motives and states of
mind. Perhaps the basic lesson of Davis, Arlington Heights, and
Castaneda is that the elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose may vary in different contexts, as Justice Stevens observed in Davis,434 because the burden of proof may depend on what
evidence is available and which party controls that evidence.
Because Davis, Arlington Heights, and Castaneda all indicate
that discriminatory purpose is essentially an evidentiary matter,
presumptions, burden of proof, and the concept of a prima facie case
have become vitally important in this area.43 5 As Castanedademonstrates, however, the justices disagree over how these concepts apply
to the proof of an equal protection claim. In particular, substantial
differences of opinion concerning the meaning of a "prima facie
case" are evident in the various Castaneda opinions. Some of these
differences are attributable to the use of the phrase in Castaneda
to describe two or three separate and distinct concepts.
In civil litigation generally, a "prima facie case" refers to that
quantum of evidence that a party with the burden of proof must
produce to avoid suffering a directed verdict (i.e., to permit a judgment in his favor). The party must introduce sufficient evidence on
every necessary element of the claim to permit a finder of fact,
acting reasonably, to decide the issue in that party's favor.43 Satisfying this burden of producing evidence, however, does not guaran434. 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
435. Indeed, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), itself may be viewed essentially as a case that established the irrebuttable presumption that racially separate schools
are unequal for purposes of the equal protection clause. See also Fiss, School Desegregation:
The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 3, 23-25 (1975) (discussing the
presumptions and burden of proof aspects of Keyes).
436. Additional complications may arise if the finder of fact is a jury. No jury sat in
Davis, Arlington Heights, or Castaneda, however, and because the primary relief sought in
most racial discrimination claims under the equal protection clause is equitable, the factfinder will usually be a judge. But see Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); note 289 supra.
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tee victory, because the evidence introduced may not convince the
factfinder that the claim is supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. Used in this sense, a prima facie showing does not shift
the burden of proof to the opposing party, who may still win, even
if he produces no rebuttal evidence whatsoever. The Supreme
Court's concern, however, has been with whether the evidence is
sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the government. This issue
is essentially whether the equal protection claimant has introduced
sufficient evidence on an issue to require a directed verdict in his
favor absent any evidence in rebuttal. A subsidiary issue is which
burden of proof is shifted to the government-merely the burden of
producing some rebuttal evidence or the entire burden of persuasion
on the discriminatory purpose issue.
The justices were badly divided on this question in Castaneda.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent viewed Partida's statistical evidence
as so unreliable that it could not establish a prima facie case that
would shift the burden to the state.4 37 Thus, he considered the proof
inadequate as a matter of law to sustain Partida's claim, which
sounds very much like a determination that the burden of production was not satisfied in the first place.
The other dissenters took different approaches that implied a
somewhat more charitable view of Partida's evidence. Justice Stewart was alone in arguing that the district court's judgment should
be upheld simply because its findings were not "clearly erroneous. '4 38 This suggests that the proof may have been legally sufficient to sustain the claim and perhaps may even have persuaded
another judge to find for Partida, but it was not strong enough to
justify overturning the trial judge's ruling for the state. Nevertheless, none of the other justices treated discriminatory purpose in
Castaneda as merely a factual finding governed by the "clearly
erroneous" standard. 3 ' This much deference to the trial judge's decision seemed inappropriate, because the proof was essentially statistical and the opportunity to observe the witnesses and judge their
credibility was of minimal importance. Except for Justice Stewart,
the Court's attitude on this point will probably bear out Justice
Stevens's prediction in Davis that "[t]he extent of deference one
pays to the trial court's determination of the factual issue, and
indeed, the extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as a
437.
438.
439.

See 97 S. Ct. at 1286 & n.1.
Id. at 1286.
See generally note 353 supra.
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question of fact or a question of law, will vary in different contexts.

',440

Justice Powell's dissent followed his approach in Arlington
Heights. He seemed to accord some, unspecified amount of weight
to the district court's judgment,"' but he also conducted an independent review of the evidence."' His basic concern was not with
which party must produce the evidence, but with what he perceived
as the equal protection claimant's continuing burden of persuasion-or more accurately, his risk of nonpersuasion-on the discriminatory purpose issue. Thus, his dissent in Castaneda argued that
"it matters little" whether Partida ever established a prima facie
case or not,4 3 because the record did include rebuttal evidence that
"satisf[ied] the State's burden of production-even assuming that
respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise to such a burden." 4" Similarly, the evidence in Arlington Heights simply did not
persuade Justice Powell that race was a motivating factor in the
trustees' decision, although it was surely sufficient to have satisfied
the plaintiffs' burden of production. In Justice Powell's view, then,
the prima facie case concept should not alter the way the Court
appraises the ultimate issue, which continues to be whether the
claimant has proved purposeful discrimination by a preponderance
45
of the evidence.
The majority in Castanedadisagreed. Its conception of the legal
significance of a prima facie case of discrimination was fundamentally different from that of the dissenters. The Court determined
that Partida's proof not only satisfied his burden of production and
his initial burden of persuasion, but it also shifted the burden of
persuasion to the state "to dispel the inference of intentional discrimination." 4 ' Furthermore, Castaneda held that the evidence
produced by Texas was insufficient as a matter of law to meet this
burden. The state did not return the burden of persuasion to Partida
simply by introducing some rebuttal evidence, such as the testimony of the state trial judge and the "governing majority" figures.
The majority's understanding of the prima facie concept in
Castaneda is clearly correct. Prior jury discrimination cases established that a prima facie showing of discrimination shifts the burden
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
97 S. Ct. at 1292.
Id. at 1290-92.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1292.
Id.
Id. at 1282.
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of persuasion to the state and that not all types of rebuttal evidence
are legally sufficient to meet the burden. As Justice Blackmun
noted in Castaneda, for example, the Court's precedents have long
established that a prima facie case is not rebutted simply by a jury
commissioner's protestation that race played no part in the selection process.447 These decisions implicitly reject the view that the
burden of persuasion always remains with the claimant. Thus, Justice Powell's approach is inconsistent with the Court's historic determination that a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination under the equal protection clause serves to shift not only the
burden of production to the government, but the burden of persuasion as well.44
Justice Powell was right, however, about one thing in
Castaneda:the case was unique.449 He was referring to the fact that
Mexican-Americans were the governing majority in Hidalgo
County, but Castanedawas unique for other, more important, reasons. The decision marked the first time the Supreme Court held
that an equal protection claimant had satisfied the new discriminatory purpose requirement established by Davis. It demonstrated
again, however, just how difficult proof of the requirement would be,
for Castaneda also involved a uniquely one-sided record. Ample
statistical evidence clearly established a substantial and ongoing
discriminatory effect. The particular state action challenged afforded little room for legitimate governmental discretion. Moreover,
the state produced practically no evidence. The fact that the Supreme Court voted only five to four to sustain Partida's claim under
these circumstances can hardly comfort those faced with the task
of proving discriminatory purpose in the future.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis that only
purposeful racial discrimination violates the equal protection clause
marks the beginning of a new era in civil rights law. Despite Justice
White's contention that this requirement was supported by a century of precedent, the Court had never before determined whether
the discriminatory effect of official action alone would suffice to
establish racial discrimination for equal protection purposes. Indeed, Davis itself did not require this holding, because the Davis
447. 97 S. Ct. at 1282 n.19. This principle was also recognized in a number of the jury
discrimination cases that the Davis opinion cited. See 426 U.S. at 241.
448. See Title VIII Litigation, supra note 359, at 157-58 & n.178.
449. See 97 S. Ct. at 1290.

No. 4]

DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE

1049

majority maintained that the plaintiffs had failed to show even a
discriminatory effect. If the circumstances of Davis raised any questions about the Court's commitment to a discriminatory purpose
test, however, they were quickly resolved in Arlington Heights, in
which the Court upheld state action that did have a discriminatory
effect on the ground that it was not motivated by a racial purpose.
Only in recent years, of course, has the purpose-effect issue
taken on major significance in civil rights cases. Equal protection
claims throughout the 1960's had focused on official action that was
obviously intended to be discriminatory. Consequently, a choice
between effect and purpose was unnecessary to decide these cases.
The Court's opinions adopted a variety of approaches for evaluating
racial discrimination claims, some appearing to focus on purpose,
some on effect, some on both, and some implying that either a
discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory effect would be unconstitutional. These opinions were not only inconsistent and confusing, but they also suggested that the proper standard might vary
depending on the particular context or the nature of the right being
asserted.
Certainly language in many of these decisions justified efforts
by civil rights claimants to challenge official action on the basis of
discriminatory effect. The importance of these efforts increased in
the early 1970's because instances of blatant, overt discrimination
declined, but facially neutral requirements that had the effect of
hurting blacks more than whites continued to frustrate efforts of
minorities to achieve full social and economic equality. In 1971, the
Supreme Court endorsed an effect test for the federal employment
discrimination law in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., but the issue was
not directly presented in an equal protection context, and the
Court's opinions in such diverse cases as Palmer v. Thompson and
Keyes v. School District No. 1 continued to give conflicting signals.
Moreover, even as the Court failed to provide any definitive guidance on how to judge claims of official racial discrimination, it indirectly contributed to the number of these claims and therefore to the
importance of this question by refusing to extend the strict scrutiny
standard to state actions discriminating against the poor or affecting important interests in housing, employment, and education.
Thus, in addition to hearing the more traditional equal protection
claims involving schools, jury selection, and voting rights, the lower
courts in the early 1970's were also called upon to decide a variety
of employment and housing discrimination cases based on the
theory that the challenged state action was unconstitutional because its impact was felt more by blacks than by whites.
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Because the Supreme Court's precedents did not dictate what
the appropriate judicial response to the effect theory should be,
policy considerations were determinative: the Court in Davis rejected the theory because it believed it would jeopardize a host of
legitimate laws, from sales taxes to bridge tolls, that clearly should
not be subject to attack on racial discrimination grounds. Thus, the
Court chose to focus on discriminatory purpose not so much because
of the inherent merits of this standard-indeed, earlier opinions had
criticized judicial review of legislative purpose on a number of
grounds-but because the alternative was seen as unacceptable.45
The fears expressed in Davis of the implications of an effect
test, however, were greatly exaggerated. The Court itself had applied an effect standard in employment discrimination cases under
Title VII with substantial flexibility and without encouraging attacks against equal pay practices on any "disproportionate racial
impact" theory. In the equal protection context, recent decisions
involving sex discrimination also showed that the Court could relax
the traditional two-tier method of analysis to deal more realistically
with new types of discrimination claims. Furthermore, the numerous lower courts that adopted an effect test in cases of racial discrimination often followed this lead by judging the government's
justification for an action with a discriminatory effect by a standard
less rigorous than the traditional compelling state interest analysis
required, such as whether the employment test under review was
"job related." By ignoring these possibilities in Davis, the Supreme
Court not only failed to make equal protection analysis more rational, it also left the impression that its choice of purpose over
effect as a standard for judging cases of official racial discrimination
was based on a rather transparent and unpersuasive "straw man"
argument.
The Davis opinion emphasized the drawbacks of an effect
standard, but ignored the problems of a test that focused on discriminatory purpose, although the Court itself had recognized these
problems in a number of earlier decisions. The primary difficulty,
of course, is that improper purpose is hard to prove, and Davis,
Arlington Heights, and Castaneda all demonstrate that an equal
protection claimant will be hard pressed to establish the necessary
discriminatory racial purpose. The effect, if not the actual purpose,
of these decisions will be to reduce the number of meritorious civil
rights claims that can be successfully brought under the equal pro450. Ironically, the Court had earlier used a similar "elimination" technique to reach
the opposite result. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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tection clause. Victims of official racial discrimination will no doubt
shift their reliance from the equal protection clause to specific civil
right laws, such as Title VII and Title VIII, which do prohibit employment and housing practices that have a discriminatory effect. 2
Judicial interpretation of these statutes will take on even greater
importance, and civil rights litigants may lobby Congress to
"review" these decisions and also to consider whether the effect
standard should be extended legislatively to protect other human
rights.
Criticism of the Davis rationale for the discriminatory purpose
standard is of academic interest only now, because Arlington
Heights and Castanedaaffirmed the Supreme Court's commitment
to a requirement of purposeful discrimination for constitutional
claims. The Court's articulation of this standard did vary in Davis,
Arlington Heights, and Castaneda,however, and its use of different
methods to examine the records in these cases for evidence of discriminatory purpose raises a variety of questions. Should the Court
decide the discriminatory purpose issue primarily by objective evidence or should it also consider testimony concerning the responsible officials' subjective motives? What will be required to establish
a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, will this vary in
different contexts, and what response by the government will be
sufficient to rebut such a case? Is discriminatory purpose a question
of fact or of law, and how much deference will the appellate courts
pay to the trial judge's determination of the question?
One thing is clear. Each case must be decided on the basis of
the particular evidence actually produced by the parties, and, in
practice if not in theory, the burden on an equal protection claimant
will be heavy indeed. Taken together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and
Castaneda indicate that proving discriminatory purpose will be difficult in all but the most egregious cases. These decisions do suggest,
however, that the chance of success will increase to the extent that
the claimant can prove a substantial discriminatory effect and to
the extent that the challenged state action does not appear to advance the legitimate purposes claimed for it. The evidence available
to prove these factors will vary, of course, but, everything else being
equal, evidence will be easier to produce when the decision under
review is one of a series of similar decisions as opposed to an isolated
451. See note 413 supra; United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
The Arlington Heights opinion, which suggested that lower courts faced with a claim based
on both a civil rights statute and the equal protection clause should ordinarily decide the
statutory question first, will probably reinforce this trend. See 429 U.S. at 271.
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act or policy, when the decision is essentially active rather than
passive, and when the decision does not involve judgments which
the courts have traditionally recognized as subject to wide discretion on the part of the responsible state officials. Possibly, the
chance of a successful claim will also vary with the extent of judicial
experience with the particular type of claim being made (compare
Davis and Arlington Heights with Castaneda) and with the Court's
perception of the importance of the right asserted and the appropriateness of the remedy requested (compare Palmerwith Castaneda).
One final prediction is also safe. Civil rights litigants and courts
alike will have to grapple with these and other issues raised by the
discriminatory purpose requirement for years to come.

